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Assessment of the Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem FMEA/CIL
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS orbiter and GFE Projects
Office to perform the hardware analysis using the instructions and
ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation
of FMEA and CI_, I0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Hydraulics/Water
Spray Boiler (HYD/WSB) hardware, generating draft failure modes
and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results con-
tained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results
were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed
Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from
the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required.
This report documents the results of that comparison for the
Orbiter HYD/WSB hardware.
The iOA product for the HYD/WSB analysis consisted of 447 failure
mode "worksheets" that resulted in 183 potential critical items
being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline (as
of 19 November 1986) which consisted of 364 FMEAs and iii CIL
items. The comparison determined if there were any results which
hadbeen found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This
comparison produced agreement on all but 68 FMEAs which caused
differences in 23 CIL items. Figure 1 presents a comparison of
the proposed Post 51-L NASA baseline, with the IOA recommended
baseline, and any issues.
The issues arose due to differences between the NASA and IOA FMEA/
CIL preparation instructions. NASA had used an older groundrules
document which has since been superseded by the NSTS 22206 used by
the IOA. After comparison, there were no discrepancies found that
were not already identified by NASA, and the remaining issues may


























































The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress safety
policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the National Space
Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has undertaken the
task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space Shuttle design.
The MDAC is providing an independent assessment of the proposed
Post 51"L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for compIeteness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utilizing
as-built drawings tu breakdown the respective subsystem into
components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item is
evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These data
are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report, and
are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is














Define subsystem analysis diagram
Define subsystem
Define major assemblies





Construct matrix of failure modes










Forward findings to Project Manager
ms
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2.4 Gzound Rules and _ssuaptions
The HYD/WSB ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were
defined to provide necessary additions and clarifications to the
























3.1 Design and Function
The hydraulic subsystem is made up of three independent hydraulic
systems, each with its own APU/pump, reservoir, water spray boiler
for APU lube oil and hydraulic fluid cooling, and distribution
systems. A typical Sys£em is shown in Figure 2.
Water Spray Boiler
The water spray boiler (WSB) system consists of three identical
independent units, one for each APU/hydraulic system. Each WSB
is used while its associated APU is active in order to cool the
APU lubricating oil and the Orbiter hydraulic fluid. Each WSB
consists of the following components:
o Water tank with gaseous nitrogen (GN2) pressurization
o Internal boiler
o Electronic controllers (two per system)
o Heaters
o Temperature and pressure sensors
The WSB stores water in a bellows-type storage tank, which is
pressurized by nitrogen to provide positive water expulsion to feed
the boiler. The WSB system operates in either a pool or spray mode.
The hydraulic fluid and APU lubricating oil pass through the
boiler in a set of tubes which are either immersed in water (pool
mode) or sprayed with water from three hydraulic fluid water spray
bars and two APU lube oil water spray bars (spray mode).
During ascent and entry the boiler operates in the pool mode. As
the vehicle ascends, the APU iube oil heats up. Eventually the
boiler water precharge boils off, and the boiler goes into the
spray mode (the hydraulic fluid usually does not heat up enough
during ascent to require any spray cooling). During the lower
part of entry, when the boiler temperature (i.e., the boiling
point of water) reaches 188 degrees F, the WSB returns to the pool
mode. The spray bars begin discharging water to fill the boiler.
As the water reaches the liquid level sensors, the spray is
turned off to prevent the boiler from overfilling. The water that
is boiled off exits the Orbiter through a steam duct located to
the right of the vertical stabilizer.
- Water SPray Boiler
The EPD&C support for a typical Water Spray Boiler unit is illus-
trated in Figure 3. The EPD&C system provides AC and DC power to
the WSB related transducers, signal conditioners and logic


























Figure 3 EPD&C - WATER SPRAY BOILER DIAGRAM
7
Control Assembly (PCA) provide the 28 Vdc required to operate the
WSB heaters and solenoid and motor operated valves. Hybrid
circuit drivers in aft load control assemblies (LCA) supply power
to the boiler control circuits and GN 2 supply control circuits
respectively in the boiler controllers. Control voltage required
to activate the drivers are supplied through boiler control
switches located on Orbiter panel R2.
The WSB has two redundant controllers, A and B. Only one
controller is used at a time. The controller regulates the water
spray and the hydraulic fluid bypass valve (bypasses WSB at 190
degrees F; flows through WSB at 210 degrees F) based on fluid
outlet temperature transducers. Controller A provides for
computation of WSB water tank quantity by the SM GPC based on
water tank temperature transducer and GN 2 line pressure readings.
Controller B is identical to Controller A except that the






H 0 quantity computation
G_ 2 tank temperature
GN 2 regulator pressure
H_O tank pressure
Hydraulic bypass valve position indicator
The water boiler, water tank, and steam Vent are equipped with
heaters to prevent freeze-up in orbit. The heaters are cycled
automatically by the WSB controller. Each controller controls
one set of redundant heaters.
Hy_;aulic System
The hydraulic system provides the hydraulic pOWer to operate the
aerosurface controls (elevons, rudder/speed brake, and body flap),
ET umbilical retractors (LH2 and L02), SSME thrust vector control
actuato£s, SSME control valvesTlandinggear retract and deploy -_
ment, main wheel brakes and antiskid control, and nosewheel
steering. Hydraulic power is generated by APU driven pumps. Two
operational systems are required to provide the maximum aero-
surface rotational rates needed for worst-case descent conditions.
Each hydraulic system uses a hydraulic fluid reservoir, which
stores and provides fluid to the inlet side of an APU-driven
variable-displacement pump. Upon demand, the fluid is pumped
through a check valve, a filter, and fluid lines which incorporate
a precharged accumulator. The accumulator serves to absorb system
pressure surges by means of a priority valve and provides pressuri-
zation to the reservoir. An electric motor driven constant
displacement circulation pump provides low pressure hydraulic
power for hydraulic system thermal conditioning and high pressure






















The EPD&C support to the hydraulics system is illustrated in
Figure 4. The switches, PBIs and circuit breakers which allow
-- the crew to configure and control the EPD&C, and the components
of the hydraulic system are located on panels on the flight deck.
The electrical power is controlled and distributed by use of power
controller assemblies and load controller assemblies. These
-- assemblies are comprised of buses, resistors, fuses, diodes, and
remote switching devices (remote power controllers, hybrid circuit
drivers, and relays). The power controller assemblies and load
controller assemblies distribute dc power to all the system loads
using remote switching devices.














Main Pump Depress Solenoid
Landing Gear Retract/Circ. Valve
MPS/TVC Isolation Valve
Landing Gear Isolation Valve
Orbiter/ET Umbilical Actuators
Temperature and Pressure Transducers
3.2 Interfaaes and Locations
The locations of the hydraulics and water sp_ay boiler components
on the Orbiter are shown in Figure 5.
The hydraulics system interfaces with and provides power to the
aerosurface controls (elevens, rudder/speedbrake, and body flap),
ET umbilical actuators (LH2 and LO2), SSME thrust vector control
actuators, SSME control valves, landing gear retract and deploy
actuators, main wheel brakes and antiskid control, and nosewheel
steering.
The water spray boiler interfaces with the hydraulics system and
the APU to provide cooling for the hydraulic fluid and APU lube
oil. In addition to this cooling interface, the hydraulics system
interfaces with the environmental control and life support system
to absorb heat from the Freon heat exchanger.
Both the hydraulics system and the water spray boiler interface
with the EPD&C system, the Display and Control (D&C) system, the
instrumentation system, and the GPC software. The EPD&C system
provides the electric power and the control assemblies for motors
and valves. The D&C system provides the capability for the crew
to monitor, configure or manually control the systems where
necessary. The instrumentation system processes the performance
parameters required for system monitoring and control. The GPC
software provides automatic control for hydraulic fluid thermal
w
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Figure 5 - HYDRAULICS AND WATER SPRAY BOILER COMPONENT LOCATIONS
II
conditioning, accumulator pressure maintenance and landing gear
isolation valve positioning. It also provides priority rate
limiting which automatically manages loads on the remaining
hydraulic systems or system if one or two hydraulic systems are




Figure 6 illustrates the hierarchy of the HYD/WSB hardware and the
corresponding components used for purposes of analysis. Figures 7
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Figure 20 - RESERVOIR ASSEMBLY
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The IOA analysis of the HYD/WSB hardware initially generated 430
failure mode worksheets and identified 166 Potential Critical
Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In order to
facilitate comparison, 46 additional failure mode analysis work-
sheets were generated. These analysis results were compared to
the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 364 FMEAs (References 11,
12, and 13 as modified by References 14, 15, and 16) and 111 CIL
items (References 17, 18, 19, and 20). Most of the discrepancy
between the number of IOA and NASA FMEAs can be explained by the
different approach used by NASA and IOA to group failure modes.
Upon completion of the assessment, 320 of 447 FMEAs were in agree-
ment. Of the 127 that remained, 59 had minor discrepancies that
did not affect criticality.
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the




I Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment I
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A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.




























nAppendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights
the NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID.
Appendix E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous analysis results reported in Space Transportation
System Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper
No. 1.0-WP-VA86001-20, Analysis of the HYD/WSB, 15 December 1986.
Appendix F provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA recommendations are also
summarized.
Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
issues is provided in subsequent paragraphs.




































Of the failure modes analyzed, 183 were determined to be critical
items. A summary of the IOA recommended critical items is
presented in Table IV.
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The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis



























IOA ID Number (First Three Digits)




4.1 Assessment Results - Water Spray Boiler
The assessment between the IOA failure modes and the Post 51-L
NASA FMEA baseline, as defined above, identified 13 WSB issues,
of which four were CIL issues. Seven of these issues relate to
the addition of new FMEAs, two of which would be CIL items. Two
issues relate to lowering the criticality of a NASA FMEA, one of
which would delete the FMEA from the CIL. Four issues relate to





4.2 Assessment Results - EPD&C - Water Spray Boiler
The assessment identified two EPD&C - WSB issues, both of which
are CIL issues. One issue related to creating a new FMEA which
would be a CIL item. The other relates to deleting a FMEA from
the CIL.
4.3 Assessment Results - Hydraulic System
The assessment identified 33 HYD issues, 11 of which are CIL
issues. Three of these issues relate to raising the criticality
of NASA FMEAs. Twenty-six issues relate to creating new FMEAs,
9 of which would be CIL items. Four issues relate to lowering
the criticality of NASA FMEAs, 2 of which would delete the FMEA
from the CIL.
4.4 Assessment Results - BPD&C - Hydraulics
The assessment identified 21 EPD&C-HYD issues, 6 of which were CIL
issues. Six of these issues relate to raising the criticality of
NASA FMEAs. Two issues relate to creating new FMEAs. Ten issues
relate to lowering the criticality of NASA FMEAs, 3 of which would
delete the FMEA from the CIL. One issue relates to removing a
NASA FMEA from the CIL because it does not meet the CIL criteria.
One issue relates to changing a redundancy screen which would add




Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:
1• JSC-18341, Mechanical Systems Console Handbook Volume
II - Systems Briefs, Rev. A PCN-3, 2-7-86
• VS70-958109, Integrated System Schematic Hydraulics,
Rev. E
• VS70-958099, Integrated System Schematic Hydraulics,
Rev. A, 4-22-82
• VS70-580996, Schematic-Hydraulic Subsystem, Rev. A,
5-30-85




JSC-12770, Shuttle Flight Operations Manual, Volume 9,
Auxiliary Power Unit/Hydraulics, Basic, 3-16-81
JSC 12820, STS Operational Flight Rules, Final PCN-3,
6-28-85
• JSC 11174, Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, Rev. C PCN-
5, 9-13-85
• NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL), 10-10-86
I0. V58 File III, Orbiter Operations and Maintenance
Requirements and Specification Document - Hydraulic
Subsystem, 12-16-85
11. STS-82-0021, Orbiter Vehicle Operational Configuration
Failure Mode Effects Analysis-Hydraulic Subsyste, 1
March 1982.
12. STS-82-0037, Orbiter Vehicle Operational Configuration
Failure Mode Effects Analysis-Active Thermal Control
and Water Spray Boiler, Change #2, 28 January 1983.
13. STS-82-0033, Orbiter Vehicle Operational Configuration
Failure Mode Effects Analysis-Electrical Power
Distribution and Control, Change #2, 28 January 1983.
14. NASA-JSC FMEA and CIL Review Comments for the
Hydraulics and Hydraulics EPD&C, 5 March 1986, as
redlined.
15. NASA-JSC FMEA and CIL Review Comments for the Water

























NASA-JSC FMEA and CIL Review Comments for the Water
Spray Boiler EPD&C, 2 March 1986, as redlined.
RI document 87MA4689, Revised Orbiter Critical Items
List (Hydraulics EPD&C), 8 dECEMBER 1987.
RI document 87MA4944, Revised Orbiter critical Items
List (Hydraulics), 22 December 1987.
RI document 88MA0161, Revised Orbiter Critical Items
List (Water Spray Boiler), 9 January 1988.
RI document 87MA4731, Revised Orbiter Critical Items








































































- Abort Once Around
- Auxiliary Power Unit
- Assembly
- Abort to Orbit
- Backup Flight System




- Cathode Ray Tube
- Caution and Warning System
- Direct Current
- Distribution
- Data Processing System
- Display Unit






- Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Gaseous Nitrogen
- General Purpose Computer
- Gallons Per Minute




- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Johnson Space Center
- Load Control Assembly
- Liquid Hydrogen
- Liquid Oxygen
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine Controler
- Main
- Monitoring
- Main Propulsion System
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System






















- Push Button Indicator
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Pounds Per Square Inch
- Rockwell International
- Redundancy Management
- Remote Power Controller
- Return to Launch Site
- Systems Management
- Solid Rocket Booster
- Space Shuttle Main Engine
- Space Transportation System
- Software
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Touch Down
- Thrust Vector Control




















































Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions






DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
mm
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, InstruGtions For Preparation
_f FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE)- an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFfECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE _MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and





















MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
?RIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
QEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAF_NG PHASE - begins at first main gear








DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
I
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CI_,. I0 October 1986, was employed with the








The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Missiondata verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error

























. All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permf££ed to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
7. Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
. The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occhr in £he phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
• Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
i0. Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
ii. Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to





DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
m
B.3 HYD/WSB-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the HYD/WSB subsystem. The analysis considered the worst case
effects of the hardware or functional failure on the subsystem,
mission, and crew and vehicle safety•
I. Where redundant systems perform non-identical functions
(e.g. hydraulics systems 1 and 2), use worst case
system.
RATIONALE: Need to identify worst case effect.
• Pyro's for lowering landing gears are "unlike
redundant" to hydraulic system I.
RATIONALE: Pyro's are sufficient to lower the landing
gear in absence of an interfering hydraulic
system 1 failure.
• In analysis cases where the meaning of hardware item
redundancy seems ambiguous, redundancy is understood to
mean that there is one or more systems that are
redundant to the system in which the hardware item
occurs.
RATIONALE: This is the most conservative assumption
for purposes of determining criticality•
• Loss of redundancy means loss of all capability to
perform function•
RATIONALE: Maintain uniform usage within project•
• Caps and fittings for quick disconnects are considered
one component.
RATIONALE: This is the most conservative assumption.
• For purposes of criticality evaluations during aborts,
assume SSME induced aborts•
RATIONALE: This is the most conservative assumption.
• Leaks (GN2, hydraulic fluid, water) are sufficiently
prolonged in time to allow recognition and response.



















• Contamination of all three hydraulic systems during
turnaround servicing is not considered a "single
credible event" in evaluating Redundancy Screen C.
RATIONALE: This is considered a ground operations
problem although the significant number of
inflight hydraulic system anomalies
attributed to contamination suggests that
it should be analyzed independently as a
potential cause of critical failure modes.
Without this assumption, all hydraulic
failure modes that llst contamination as a




































This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen





= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :







NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0602-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
.(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0618-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0618-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LINES AND FITTINGS (GN2-WATER)
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C p ] [ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA COMMENTS. TWO FMEAs ARE REQUIRED TO
























NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0619-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LINES AND FITTINGS (GN2-WATER)
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA COMMENTS. TWO FMEAs ARE REQUIRED TO
ADDRESS WATER LEAKAGE (06-3-0618-1) AND GN2 LEAKAGE (06-3-0619-1)
INDEPENDENTLY.
w






NASA _EA #: 06-3A-0603-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







_AD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY RED_DANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ I
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONAl: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA CON_S WITH NASA. _O _As _ _QUI_D TO ADD_$S LUBE































NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0603-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. TWO FMEAs ARE REQUIRED TO ADDRESS LUBE
OIL RESTRICTED FLOW (06-3A-0603-4) AND HYDRAULIC FLUID RESTRICTED
FLOW (06-3A-0603-6). IOA CONCURS WITH CIL REDUNDANCY SCREEN
RATIONALE.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. TWO FMEAs ARE REQUIRED TO ADDRESS







































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. TWO FMEAs ARE REQUIRED TOADDRESS























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. TWO FMEAs ARE REQUIRED TO ADDRESS LUBE






























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. TWO FMEAs ARE REQUIRED TO ADDRESS LUBE
OIL INTERNAL LEAKAGE (06-3A-0603-2) AND HYDRAULIC OIL INTERNAL
LEAKAGE (06-3A-0603-5).






















[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]










[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [


























NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0605-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SPRAY VALVE (WATER SUPPLY)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )












NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0605-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SPRAY VALVE (WATER SUPPLY)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























SPRAY VALVE (WATER SUPPLY)





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















SPRAY VALVE (WATER SUPPLY)






NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE IS INCORPORATED AS A "CAUSE" IN FMEA 06-3A-0605-2
BUT HAS DIFFERENT CRITICALITY BECAUSE SWITCHING TO REDUNDANT









































BOILER TANK TEMP SENSORS




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




#iii SAYS AN OPEN CAUSES A COLD READING. NASA SAYS OPEN CAUSES A
HOT READING.
NASA FMEA 06-3-0627-1 OPEN OR SENSOR OUT OF TOLERANCE.
SWITCHING TO REDUNDANT CONTROLLER RESTORES NORMAL OPERATION.
SCREEN B IS NOT APPLICABLE TO STANDBY REDUNDANCY.












BOILER TANK TEMP SENSORS





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA 06-3-0627-1 & 06-3-0627-2 COMBINED.
[ ]
[ ]
WE DIFFER ON WHAT READING A SHORT WOULD CAUSE (HOT VS COLD).
SWITCHING TO REDUNDANT CONTROLLER RESTORES NORMAL OPERATION.

































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA 06-3-0627-1 ERRONEOUS HOT CONDITION AND 06-3-0627-2
ERRONEOUS COLD CONDITION ARE COMBINED INTO ONE FMEA 06-3-0627-2
ELECTRICAL SHORT OR SENSOR OUT OF TOLERANCE.
SWITCHING TO REDUNDANT CONTROLLER RESTORES NORMAL OPERATION.
SCREEN B IS NOT APPLICABLE TO STANDBY REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0611-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A _ B C ...........
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA 06-3-0611-1 AND 06-3-0621-1 COVER THE OPEN & SHORT
CONDITIONS - 0611-1 IS A PRIMARY CONTROLLER FMEA.
SWITCHING TO REDUNDANT CONTROLLER RESTORES NORMAL OPERATION.


























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]































RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA 06-3-0611-1 AND 06-3-0621-1 COVER THE OPEN & SHORT
CONDITIONS - 0611-1 IS A PRIMARY CONTROLLER FMEA.
SWITCHING TO REDUNDANT CONTROLLER RESTORES NORMAL OPERATION.
SCREEN B IS NOT APPLICABLE TO STANDBY REDUNDANCY.



















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









































STEAM VENT RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA. THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED BY FMEA.























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERS RAIN GETTING INTO ORIFICE AND SHORTING HTRS.
#117 DOES NOT CONSIDER RAIN GETTING INTO THE ORFICE WHILE ON PAD.
#117 CONSIDERS RESTRICTED FLOW TO BE CAUSED BY LOSS OF HEATERS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "CONTAMINATION" AND "STUCK OR INGESTED BLOW-
OFF SETAM VENT PLUG" BE DELETED FROM CAUSES FOR 06-3A-0604-I AND
"STUCK OR INGESTED BLOW-OFF STEAM VENT PLUG" BE INCORPORATED INTO
06-3A-0633-I. THEN, SWITCHING TO REDUNDANT CONTROLLER RESTORES



































HYDRAULIC/LUBE OIL WATER FILTERS
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA. THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED BY A FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0624-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






STEAM DUMP NOZZLE TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




06-3-0624-1 STATES "OPEN" CAUSES HOT SIGNAL - #119 STATES "SHORT
CAUSES HOT SIGNAL - ERRONEOUS OUTPUT IS THE RESULT IN EITHER
CASE.


























NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0624-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






STEAM DUMP NOZZLE TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: J . DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




06-3-9624-2 AND #119 DIFFER ON WHAT CAUSES THE HOT AND COLD
SENSOR OUTPUT.
u





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0624-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






STEAM DUMP NOZZLE TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA COMBINED OPEN (ELECTRICAL) AND OUT OF TOLERANCE, ASSIGNED
CRITICALITY 3/IRo A SHORT (E_CTRICAL) AND OUT OF TOLERANCE WERE
COMBINED AND ASSIGNED A CRITICALITY OF 3/3. WORKSHEET ii0 TREATS
OUT OF TOLERANCE DUE TO CALIBRATION SHIFT. SCREEN B IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO STANDBY REDUNDANCY. (*NOTE - #121 SCREENS SHOULD


































NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0624-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






STEAM DUMP NOZZLE TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ]


























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0617-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BOILER WATER FILL AND DRAIN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[F] [F] [P] [ ]*
[P] [P] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA 06-3-0617-3 AND 06-3-0617A-3 CONSIDER CAP & POPPET AS
SEPARATE ITEMS - #123 CONSIDERS CAP & POPPET AS ONE ASSEMBLY.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA CRITICALITIES. HOWEVER, ALL SCREENS
SHOULD BE "NA" PER NSTS 22206 DOCUMENT. FMEA 06-3-0617-3













NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0617A-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BOILER WATER FILL AND DRAIN
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT'.
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[P] CP] [P]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA 06-3-0617-3 AND 06-3-0617A-3 CONSIDER CAP & POPPET AS
SEPARATE ITEMS - #123 CONSIDERS CAP & POPPET AS ONE ASSEMBLY.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA CRITICALITIES. HOWEVER, ALL SCREENS
SHOULD BE "NA" PER NSTS 22206 DOCUMENT. FMEA 06-3-0617-3
































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LET E )













NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0616-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 125
ITEM: LUBE OIL DRAIN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 06-3_0616"2 CONSIDERS POPPET LEAKAGE - INTERNAL TO CAP
- CAP SEPARATE. IOA CONCURS WITH FMEA 0616-3.
#126 CONSIDERS POPPET & CAP AS AN ASSIY.






NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0616-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 126
ITEM: LUBE OIL DRAIN
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA2ME_6_0_!6u2_CONSIDERS POPPET LEAKAGE - INTERNAL TO CAP
- CAP SEPARATE. IOA CONCURS WITH FMEA 06i6-2.






























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




SCREEN B IS NOT APPLICABLE TO STANDBY REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]













LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ NA] [ ] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C






















NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0629-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LUBE OIL TEMP SENSOR





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]




[ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ P ] [ ]
[ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [






FMEA 06-3-0629-1 SAYS HOT SIGNAL CAUSED BY OPEN. 130 SAYS SHORT
CAUSES HOT SIGNAL.
SCREEN B IS NOT APPLICABLE TO STANDBY REDUNDANCY.












LUBE OIL TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[F] CP] [P]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [P] [NA] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA 06-3-0629-2 STATES COLD CAUSED BY SHORT. #131 STATES COLD
CAUSED BY OPEN. IOA EVALUATION IS BASED ON SHUTTLE SYSTEMS
HANDBOOK, VOL 2, DWG 12.4, REV C5. TEMP SENSOR FAILURE WOULD BE





























LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




H20 TANK DOES NOT QUALIFY AS PRESSURE VESSEL PER NSTS 22206, PARA
2.1.r.3. MDAC ID #132 SHOULD BE DELETED.
m






NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0608-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )



































NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0608-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]






NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0608-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)





































NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0613-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 135
ITEM: WATER TANK FILL





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]












(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0613-2
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 136
ITEM: WATER TANK FILL











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA CONSIDERS POPPET & CAP AS TWO SEPARATE ASSEMBLIES. #136


















NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0613-3
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 136
ITEM: WATER TANK FILL







NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
Cp] [p] Cp] IX]
IN] IN] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
c 2
(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FMEA CONSIDERS POPPET & CAP HAS TWO SEPARATE ASSEMBLIES. #136






















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FMEA 06-3-0611-1 ALSO COVERS THIS FAILURE (CONTROLLER).





































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FMEA 06-3-0611-1 ALSO COVERS THIS FAILURE (CONTROLLER).
SCREEN B IS NOT APPLICABLE TO STANDBY REDUNDANCY.
w












WATER TANK TEMP SENSOR




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ HA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0626-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WATER TANK TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




WE DIFFER ON THE OPEN OR SHORT CAUSING THE HOT AND COLD READINGS.






NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0626-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WATER TANK TEMP SENSOR





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )































LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)


























LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FMEA 06-3-0609-2 DELETED BY NASA. COMBINED WITH 06-3-0609-1.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA 06-3-0609-2 BE RETAINED. THE FAILURE
MODE OF FMEA 06-3-0609-2 (EXTERNAL LEAK) IS DIFFERENT IN NATURE






























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]







NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0607-I
NASA_ DATA :
BASELIN E l












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMP_ [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] CP]
Cp] [P]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)












































GN2 REGULATOR RELIEF VALVE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR I [ P I [ P I [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















GN2 REGULATOR RELIEF VALVE




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


























NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0606-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[p] [P] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
GN2 REGULATOR VALVE IN SERIES WOULD REGULATE PRESSURE TO H20 TANK
- REQUIRES SECOND FAILURE TO CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC


























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0615-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )








































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA CONSIDERS CAP & POPPET AS TWO ASSEMBLIES. #152 CONSIDERED
THEM AS ONE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA.
r_
r

















NaSA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]












[ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
[ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
ZNAD_QUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA CONSIDERS CAP & POPPET AS TWO ASSEMBLIES. IOA CONSIDERED




































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA CONSIDERS CAP AND POPPET AS TWO SEPARATE ITEMS. #154



































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS o CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
=
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FMEA CONSIDERS CAP AND POPPET AS TWO SEPARATE LINES. #154
CONSIDERS THEM AS ONE. IOA CONCURS WITH FMEAs 06-3A-0614-3 AND -
2.
--=











GN2 TANK TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE),






























NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0625-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GN2 TANK TEMP SENSOR





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]











[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )













NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0631-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GN2 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ....... ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0631-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GN2 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















GN2 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR







HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]











































GN2 REGULATOR OUT PRESSURE SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[N] IN] IN]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA. THIS PRESSURE IS USED IN WATER QUANTITY
CALCULATION AND THE FAILURE SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED BY A FMEA WHICH
INCORPORATES MDAC ID'S 160, 161, 162, & 163.
w






















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































GN2 REGULATOR PRESSURE SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA. SEE MDAC ID #160.
[ ]
[ ]














GN2 REGULATOR PRESSURE SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] E ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] [N] [N]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA - THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED BY A FMEA. OMS
SUBSYSTEM HAS FAILURE INCIDENTS THAT SUPPORT THIS AS A CREDIBLE
FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0610-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
































NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0610-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0610-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [


































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ]





[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0610-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT CONSIDER EFFECTS OF HIGH DEMANDS DURING ENTRY.
AGREES WITH NASA ASSESSMENT.















HYDRAULIC BYPASS VALVE MOTOR
J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA. FMEA 03-6-0610-1 AND -2 SHOULD BE EXPANDED SO























NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0628-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYDRAULIC BYPASS/RELIEF VALVE TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
•(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0628-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYDRAULIC BYPASS/RELIEF VALVE TEMP SENSOR





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0628-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYDRAULIC BYPASS/RELIEF VALVE TEMP SENSOR





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SCREEN B IS NOT APPLICABLE TO STANDBY REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2021-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NEW [ X ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









NASA FMEA #: 05-6WA-2051-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BOILER CONTROL POWER/HEATER SW
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SCREEN B NOT APPLICABLE FOR STANDBY REDUNDANCY. IOA ASSUMED
CONTACTS FOR ONE SWITCH POSITON FAILED. NASA ASSUMED ALL
CONTACTS IN SWITCH FAILED (I.E., CAN'T TOGGLE SWITCH TO






















NEW [ X ]
HYD/WSB
178
BOILER CONTROL POWER/HEATER SW
J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
SCREEN B IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR STANDBY REDUNDANCY.
IOA ASSUMED CONTACTS FOR ONE SWITCH POSITION FAILED. NASA
ASSUMED ALL CONTACTS IN SWITCH FAILED (I.E., CAN'T TOGGLE SWITCH
TO CONTROLLER "A" OR "B"). IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ASSESSMENT.




NASA FMEA #: 05-6WA-2054-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 179
ITEM: BOILER CNTRL SW
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]-
(ADD/DELETE)

































ASSESSMENT ID: _ HYDWSB-180
NASA FMEA #: 05-6WA-2054-I
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 180
ITEM: BOILER CNTRL SW





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
























(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] C ]












NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































NEW [ X ]
HYD/WSB
182
RESISTOR-VOLTAGE DIVIDER (12K, I/4W)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (Ifdifferent from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SCREENS SHOULD BE "NA" PER 22206 DOCUMENT.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2086-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





















NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2086-IC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























BOILER N2 SUPPLY SW








NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ N ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [































BOILER N2 SUPPLY SW





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2208-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SCREEN B NOT APPLICABLE FOR STANDBY REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2208-1D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





























ASSESS NT DATE: 1/08/8V
ASSESSMENT ID: ....HYDWSB-188
NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2179-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SCREEN B NOT APPLICABLE FOR STANDBY REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THERMOSTATS ARE UNLIKE REDUNDANT TQ RPC'S FOR THISFA_LUR_. IOA
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2259-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]








(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SCREEN B NOT APPLICABLE FOR STANDBY REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2259-2
NASA DATA:
-BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2259A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC _ A B C -
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0611-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 00-3-0612-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0612-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

























HYBRID DRIVER CIRCUIT (CONTROLLER)
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































HYBRID DRIVER CIRCUIT (CONTROLLER)
LEAD ANALYST : J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE HAS THE SAME EFFECT AS FMEA 05-6WA'2_5.2 AND SHOULD
BE RECOGNIZED BY A FMEA.





















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA 02-6-E24-I INCORPORATES MDAC ID'S 401 AND 412. NASA
CRITICALITY REFLECTS WORST CASE SCENARIO, I.E., INSTANTANEOUS
LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURE.
CREW GETS SM ALERT IF ACCUM. GN2 PRESSURE DROPS BELOW 1900 PSIA
- CIRC PUMP SWITCHES ARE PLACED IN "GPC" POSITION APPROXIMATELY 2
1/2 HOURS INTO MISSION. THIS ACTIVATES SOFTWARE THAT WILL














NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 2 /IR ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /!R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] [P] CP]
[P] [P] CP]
C ] C ] C ]
[ x ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE DELETED. IT IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE IN
FLIGHT.
m






NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E24-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























SUBS YSTEM: HYD/WS B
MDAC ID: 406
ITEM: PRESSURE GAGE






NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS A FMEA BE PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE THIS FAILURE.






























NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THIS FAILURE IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY SIGNIFICANT TO NEED A FMEA.









NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB .........
MDAC ID: 409
ITEM: GN2 PRESSURE TRANSDUCER




HDW/FUNC A _: B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THERE IS NO NASA FMEA ADDRESSING ACCUMULATOR GN2 PRESSURE
TRANSDUCER FAILURES. A FMEA SHOULD-BE PREP_CO_INGTHESE
TRANSDUCERS SIMILAR TO FMEA 02-6-A16-4 FOR SSME ACCUMULATORS.
THIS NEW FMEA SHOULD INCORPORATE MDAC ID'S 409, 410 AND 411 IN
THE SAME MANNER THAT FMEA 02-6-A16-4 INCORPORATES MDAC ID'S 421,
422, AND 423.



















































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THERE IS NO NASA FMEA ADDRESSING AC_LATORGN2PRESSURE
TRANSDUCER FAILURES. A FMEASHOULD_BEPREPAREDC0VERINGTHESE
TRANSDUCERS SIMILAR TO FMEA 02-6-A16-4 FOR SSME ACCUMULATORS.
THIS NEW FMEA SHOULD INCORPORATE MDAC ID'S 409, 410 AND 411 IN
THE SAME MANNER THAT FMEA 02-6-A16-4 INCORPORATES MDAC ID'S 421,
422, AND 423.
GN2 PRESSURES ARE MONITORED BY C&W SYSTEM AND ACCUM. PRESSURE
CONTROL SOFTWARE. ..............
w





















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THERE IS NO NASA FMEA ADDRESSING ACCUMULATOR GN2 PRESSURE
TRANSDUCER FAILURES. A FMEA SHOULD BE PREPARE_D COVERING THESE
TRANSDUCERS SIMILAR TO FMEA 02-6-A16-4 FOR SSME ACCUMULATORS.
THIS NEW FMEA SHOULD INCORPORATE MDAC ID'S 409, 410 AND 411 IN
THE S_ MANNER THAT FMEA 02-6-A16-4 INCORPORATESMDAC iD'S 421,
422, AND 4_2-_.





















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E24-I
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 412
ITEM: GN2 FILL VALVE




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA 02-6-E24-I INCORPORATES MDAC ID'S 401 AND 412. NASA
CRITICALITY REFLECTS WORST CASE SCENARIO, I.E, INSTANTANEOUS LOSS
OF GN2 PRESSURE.
CREW GETS SM ALERT IF ACCUM. GN2 PRESSURE DROPS BELOW 1900 PSIA.
CIRC PUMP SWITCHES ARE PLACED IN "GPC" POSITION APPROX. 2 1/2
HOURS INTO MISSION. THIS ACTIVATES SOFTWARE THAT WILL
AUTOMATICALLY TURN ON CIRC PUMP IF ACCUM. GN2 PRESSURE DROPS
BELOW
1960 PSIA.






NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A16-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)


















LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
_BASELIN_:[ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A16-I
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 416
ITEM: GN2 FILL VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FMEA 02-6-A16-I INCORPORATES MDAC ID'S 413 AND 416.
C ]
[ ]

















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)




























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A16-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A16-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC _A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A16-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FMEA -02-6-A16-4 INCORPORATES MDAC ID'S 421, 422, AND 423.



















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [































[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] C ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_- _i_ _ ADEQUATE
.... INADEQUATE
REMARKS:












NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E29-I
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 428
ITEM: LOW PRESS PUMP







[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] C ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E29-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 429
ITEM: HI PRESS PUMP









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATI ONS ." (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E29-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PRESS ACTIVATED RELIEF VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































PRESS ACTIVATED RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] -[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A FMEA BE WRITTEN TO COVER THiS FAILURE.
w
u




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)


























PRESS ACTUATED CONTROL VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE, MDAC ID #433, SHOULD BE DELETED. IT IS REDUNDANT











NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PRESS ACTUATED CONTROL VALVE





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FMEA 02-6-E27-I INCORPORATES THIS FAILURE.
n






NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E27-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE (MDAC ID #437) SHOULD BE DELETED. IT REQUIRES TWO
FAILURES.






NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E27-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] .[ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E27
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[" 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























PRESS. ACTIVATED BYPASS VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE (MDAC ID #440) SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH MDAC ID #442.





























PRESS. ACTIVATED BYPASS VALVE
W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE, MDAC ID #441, SHOULD BE DELETED. IT IS HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE AND HAS NEGLIGIBLE EFFECT.












NEW [ X ]
HYD/WSB
442
PRESS. ACTIVATED BYPASS VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH MDAC ID #440. THE EFFECTS
ARE THE SAME.
NASA REVIEW DELETED FMEA 02-6-E27-3. THIS FMEA SHOULD BE
RETAINED AND "CAUSES" EXPANDED TO COVER ALL CAUSES OF LEAKAGE


































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E26-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E26-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )


















ITEM: TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCERS NOT USED FOR CIRC PUMP
TEMPERATURE CONTROL





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 447
ITEM: TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCERS MONITORED BY FDA AND






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )










NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E02-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






QUICK DISCONNECTS-GROUND SERVICING (RETURN)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA FOR HYDRAULICS/WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSUMED THAT QUICK
DISCONNECTS AND CAPS WERE A SINGLE UNIT FOR ANALYSIS PURPOSES.
THE NASA ASSUMPTION THAT THEY ARE REDUNDANT ITEMS IS MORE
REALISTIC. MDAC ANALYSIS SHEETS 448 AND 449 SHOULD BE REWRITTEN
TO ANALYZE BOTH THE QUICK DISCONNECT AND CAP. THE FLIGHT
CRITICALITIES THEN BECOME 3/1R. THE SUPPLY AND RETURN LINE QD'S
HAVE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY BECAUSE OF A CHECK VALVE IN























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E02-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






QUICK DISCONNECTS-GROUND SERVICING (RETURN)
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA FOR HYDRAULICS/WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSUMED THAT QUICK
DISCONNECTS AND CAPS WERE A SINGLE UNIT FOR ANALYSIS PURPOSES.
THE NASA ASSUMPTION THAT THEY ARE REDUNDANT ITEMS IS MORE
REALISTIC. MDAC ANALYSIS SHEETS 448 AND 449 SHOULD BE REWRITTEN
TO ANALYZE BOTH THE QUICK DISCONNECT AND CAP. THE FLIGHT
CRITICALITIES THEN BECOME 3/IR. THE CAP SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
"STANDBY REDUNDANT". THE SUPPLY AND RETURN LINE QD'S HAVE
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY BECAUSE OF A CHECK VALVE IN THE
SUPPLY LINE. NASA FMEA'S SHOULD REFLECT THIS.
I





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E02-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






QUICK DISCONNECT-GROUND SERVICING (SUPPLY)
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FOR HYDRAULICS/WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSUMED THAT QUICK
DISCONNECTS AND CAPS WERE A SINGLE UNIT FOR ANALYSIS PURPOSES.
THE NASA ASSUMPTION THAT THEY ARE REDUNDANT ITEMS IS MORE
REALISTIC. MDAC ANALYSIS SHEETS 448 AND 449 SHOULD BE REWRITTEN
TO ANALYZE BOTH THE QUICK DISCONNECT AND CAP. THE SUPPLY AND
RETURN LINE QDIS HAVE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY. NASA




















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E02-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






QUICK DISCONNECT-GROUND SERVICING (SUPPLY)
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FOR HYDRAULICS/WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSUMED THAT QUICK
DISCONNECTSANDCAPSWE_EA_SINGLEUNIT FORANALYSIS PURPOSES
THE NASA ASSUMPTION THAT THEY ARE REDUNDANT ITEMS IS MORE
REALISTIC. MDAC ANALYSIS SHEETS 448 AND 449 SHOULD BE REWRITTEN
TO ANALYZE BOTH THE QUICK DISCONNECT AND CAP. THE SUPPLY AND
RETURN LINE QD'S HAVE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY. NASA
FMEA'S SHOULD REFLECT THIS. THE CAP SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
"STANDBY REDUNDANT".





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C08-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECT-HYD. GROUND POWER SUPPLY-
LANDING GEAR STOW/DEPLOY
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]. [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ ./ ] [ ] [ -] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA FOR HYDRAULICS/WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSUMED THAT QUICK
DISCONNECTS AND CAPS WERE SINGLE UNIT FOR ANALYSIS PURPOSES. THE
NASA ASSUMPTION THAT THEY ARE REDUNDANT ITEMS IS MORE REALISTIC.
THE ANALYSIS SHEET (MDAC ID 450 SHOULD BE REWRITTEN TO ANALYZE























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C08-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECT-HYD. GROUND POWER SUPPLY-
LANDING GEAR STOW/DEPLOY
LEAD ANALYST: Wo DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA FOR HYDRAULICS/WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSUMED THAT QUICK
DISCONNECTS AND CAPS WERE SINGLE UNIT FOR ANALYSIS PURPOSES. THE
NASA ASSUMPTION THAT THEY ARE REDUNDANT ITEMS IS MORE REALISTIC.
THE ANALYSIS SHEET (MDAC ID 450 SHOULD BE REWRITTEN TO ANALYZE
BOTH QUICK DISCONNECT AND CAP. THE CRITICALITIES THEN BECOME
3/IR. THE CAP SHOULD BE CONSIDERED "STANDBY REDUNDANT".






NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A02-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CRITICALITY BASED ON SINGLE FAILURE TO DISCONNECT. IF NASA's
POSITION T_T THIS FAILURE IS CRIT 3 IS VALID THEN FMEA 02_6-A02 -














NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A02-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]






NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A02-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ I /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
• INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS BASED ON DISCUSSION
WITH JERRY BORRER/DF65.
IOA CRITICALITY BASED ON SINGLE FAILURE TO DISCONNECT. IF NASA's
POSITION THAT FAILURE 02-6-A02-2 IS CRIT 3 IS VALID; THEN FMEA






















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] C P ]
[P] [P]







[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....











































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
HYD/WSB
455
CHECK VALVE-RETURN LINE FROM ENG'S/ACT's
W. DAVIDSON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERS A 3/3 CRITICALITY TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE 22206
DOCUMENT. WE RECOMMEND DOWNGRADING THE CRITICALITY TO 3/3
THEREBY REMOVING THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL.
w








NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A07-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CHECK VALVE-RETURN LINE FROM ENG'S/ACT'S
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] [N]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HOSE AND SWIVEL ASSY:TVC ACTUATORS







[ 2 /IR ]
[ 2 /IR ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C






COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 02-6-Ali-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HOSE AND SWIVEL ASSY:TVC ACTUATORS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HOSE AND SWIVEL ASSY:TVC ACTUATORS/SSME HYD-




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
458 & 459 CAN BE COMBINED IF THERE IS NO MEANINGFUL DIFFERENCE IN
EFFECTS DUE TO DIFFERENT TIME DELAYS OF FAILURE.
w





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A15-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HOSE AND SWIVEL ASSY:TVC ACTUATORS/SSME HYD-
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT-.
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
458 & 459 CAN BE COMBINED IF THERE IS NO MEANINGFUL DIFFERENCE IN























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HOSE AND SWIVEL ASSY:TVC ACTUATORS/SSME HYD.




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]














NEW [ X ]
HYD/WSB
459
HOSE AND SWIVEL ASSY:TVC ACTUATORS/SSME HYD.




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)





























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HOSE AND SWIVEL ASSY: WATER SPRAY BOILERS







HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )













NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E28-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HOSE AND SWIVEL ASSY: WATER SPRAY BOILERS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NOSE WHEEL STEERING FLEX HOSE ASSEMBLY





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 02-6-GI0-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MAIN LANDING GEAR FLEX HOSE (EXTEND)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SCREEN B SHOULD BE CHANGED TO NOT APPLICABLE. THE PYROS ARE






















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-GII-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MAIN LANDING GEAR FLEX HOSE (RETRACT)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




[p] [ p] [ p] [ x] *
[P] [F] [P] IX]
[ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SCREEN B SHOULD BE CHANGED TO NOT APPLICABLE. THE PYROS ARE
UNLIKE REDUNDANT ITEMS AND ARE EXCLUDED BY 2.3.4.b.2.c OF NSTS
22206.
w




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [F] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SECOND FMEA SHOULD BE WRITTEN TO COVER RUPTURE OF HYDRAULIC









NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYDRAULIC LINE (RETURN) SYSTEM 1
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /iR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LANDING GEAR WILL BE UNLOCKED AND LOWERED BEFORE HYDRAULIC FLUID
IS DEPLETED. A FMEA SHOULD BE WRITTEN TO COVER RUPTURE OF
HYDRAULIC LINE SEGEMENTS THAT HAVE CRITICALITIES DIFFERENT THAN















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] '[ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA 02-6-SYSTEM-3 REPRESENTS WORST CASE HYDRAULIC LINE RUPTURE.
















NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
• , ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:

















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G04-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE (N.O.)
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA CRITICALITY IS BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PYRO
UNLOCK MECHANISM CANNOT OVERRIDE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE LOCKUP.
:r
n







NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G04-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)




























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE (N.O.)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [F] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SECOND FMEA SHOULD BE WRITTEN TO COVER EXTERNAL LEAKS THAT ARE










NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G05-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LANDING GEAR DUMP SOLENOID VALVE (N.C.)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF REDUNDANT ITEM (L.G. CONTROL/UPCIRC VALVE) WILL RESULT



















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G05-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LANDING GEAR DUMP SOLENOID VALVE (N.C.)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA _A #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






_DING G_ D_P S0_NOID v_ (N.C.)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
IT_
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMP_ [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY ISCREENS .... CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] [ ] *
[p] [x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DELETE THIS MDAC ID. BECAUSE OF VALVE DESIGN, IT IS IDENTICAL TO
MDAC ID 476.
w

















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w


















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH NASA EVALUATION. INADEQUATE INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT
















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C07-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FMEA 02-6-C07-2 INCORPORATES MDAC ID'S 479 AND 480.
[x]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C07-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C07-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE






HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FMEA 02-6-C07-I INCORPORATES MDAC ID'S 481 AND 482.
ix]
[ ]







NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C07-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RECOMMEND DELETING THIS FAILURE (MDAC ID 483). VALVE DESIGN
MAKES IT NON-THREATENING.






NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE POS. INDICATION
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA BE WRITTEN TO COVER THIS FAILURE.
LANDING GEAR IS0UV_LVE "FAILS TOOPEN" (FMEA 02-6-C07-2) OR
"PREMATURE OPEN" (FMEA 02-6-C07-I) ARE CRITICALITY 2/IR.






NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G13-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC. SOLENOID VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/IR ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA CRITICALITY IS BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PYRO


































LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC. SOLENOID VALVE
W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA DELETED FMEA 02-6-G13-3. THIS FMEA SHOULD BE RETAINED. IF
THE VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE ON THE GOUND AND REMAINED IN THE OPEN













NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G13-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC. SOLENOID VALVE





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC SOLENOID VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [F] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SECOND FMEA SHOULD BE WRITTEN TO COVER EXTERNAL LEAKS THAT ARE
NOT DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT PER DOC. 22206 DEFINITION./








NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G14-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESTRICTOR, HYDRAULIC, L.G. RETRACT LINE





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







[ F ] [ P ]
IF] [P]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G02-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LANDING GEAR CONTROL VALVE-2POS, 3WAY, SOLENOID




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G02-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LANDING GEAR CONTROL VALVE-2POS, 3WAY, SOLENOID




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G02-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LANDING GEAR CONTROL VALVE-2POS, 3WAY, SOLENOID





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LANDING GEAR CONTROL VALVE - 2 POS, 3 WAY,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SECOND FMEA SHOULD BE WRITTEN TO COVER EXTERNAL LEAKS THAT ARE

























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A06-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
=

















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS. •
(If applicable)




















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A06-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]






NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)






















NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[p] [P] [P] [x]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.... ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RESOURCES ARE INADEQUATE TO ADEQUATELY ASSESS THE NASA


































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RECOMMEND DELETING MDAC 602. RESTRICTED FLOWS WOULD













NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )



























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E06-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
m






NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /1R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E06-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PRESSURE COMPENSATOR SPOOL VALVE





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E06-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PRESSURE COMPENSATOR SPOOL VALVE





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
I0A [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]








NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E06-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PRESSURE COMPENSATOR SPOOL VALVE




HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)

































NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E30-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
i


















HDW/FUNC A _ B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
































NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E30-2
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 614
ITEM: FLEX HOSE (CASE)





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w






NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E04-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SHAFT SEAL DRAIN PORT





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )









































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA SCREEN B RATIONALE. HAD NOT CONSIDERED
TIME FACTOR.



















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM2_:
(If applicable)































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. A CLOSED CHECK VALVE IS NOT
CREDIBLE, SINCE THE VALVE HAS A LOW OPENING PRESSURE.
















NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E03-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DELETE THIS ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET. THE RESERVOIR PRESSURE SHOULD










NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E03-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ p ] [ p ]
[P] [P]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E03-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w














LOW PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























LOW PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LE TE )






















LOW PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [































LOW PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]


















(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]






NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E03-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (Zf different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E03-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E03-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]


































NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C05-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C P ] C P ]
CP] [P]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C05-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






















E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A FMEA BE WRITTEN TO COVER AN INTERNAL

















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C05-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE.
ix]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C05-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
W. E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
[ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE RECOMMENDED FMEA COVERING
INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE OF AN E.T. UMBILICAL ACTUATOR.
(REFERENCE MDAC ID #645)
w















LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DELETE THIS ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET. THIS FAILURE WOULD EFFECT
GROUND OPERATIONS.













LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A "RESTRICTED FLOW" OR "FAILS CLOSED" FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE
































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE RECOMMENDED FMEA COVERING
INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE OF AN E.T. UMBILICAL ACTUATOR.
(REFERENCE MDAC ID #645)
w
w












LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA_
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
• (ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE COVERED BYTHE RECOMMENDED FMEA COVERING






















LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE RECOMMENDED FMEA COVERING


























LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A "RESTRICTED FLOW" OR "FAILS CLOSED" FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE
CREATED FOR THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM AND ITS COMPONENTS.













LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A "RESTRICTED FLOW"QR',FAILSCLOSED" FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE
































LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] C N ] C N ] C N ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE RECOMMENDED INTERNAL
LEAKAGE FAILURE OF AN E.T. UMBILICAL ACTUAT_OR.
m
L
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A "RESTRICTED FLOW" OR "FAILS CLOSED" FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE











































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(_DD/DELETE)




A "RESTRICTED FLOW" OR "FAILS CLOSED" FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE
CREATED FOR THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM AND ITS COMPONENTS.













LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE RECOMMENDED INTERNAL


























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A NEW FMEA SHOULD BE CREATED TO COVER THIS FAILURE MODE.
w
w












LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A "RESTRICTED FLOW" OR "FAILS CLOSED" FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE


























LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
-_ _ _ (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE RECOMMENDED INTERNAL
LEAKAGE FAILURE OF AN E.T. UMBILICAL ACTUATOR.




















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
C ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A "RESTRICTED FLOW" OR "FAILS CLOSED" FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE

































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE RECOMMENDED INTERNAL
LEAKAGE FAILURE OF AN E.T. UMBILICAL ACTUATOR.
w












LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A "RESTRICTED FLOW" OR "FAILS CLOSED" FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE








































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
_ INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE RECOMMENDED INTERNAL


















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C




















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C09-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FLEX HOSE & SWIVEL ASSEMBLY (SUPPLY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C09-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FLEX HOSE & SWIVEL ASSEMBLY (RETURN)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)





























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE E.T. UMBILICAL ACTUATOR SHOULD BE A
"3". TWO OF THE THREE ACTUATORS PER SIDE COULD FAIL WITHOUT
DAMAGING THE ORBITER.
w



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]









(If different from NASA)
] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
RECOMMEND FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY BE CHANGED TO 3. THE "FAILS TO





























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)





























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E13-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DELETE ASSESSMENT (MDAC #679). THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DELETE ASSESSMENT (MDAC #680). THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO















SHAFT SEAL DRAIN HOSE





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























SHAFT SEAL MANIFOLD DRAIN
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DELETE ASSESSMENT (MDAC #682). THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO
SIGNIFICANT EFFECT IN FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E13-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SHAFT SEAL MANIFOLD DRAIN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
ZOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]








































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ HA]
[P] [P] [P]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E05-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E04-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OLEOPHOBIC FILTER (TYPE II)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
cOMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C






























MANIFOLD SHAFT SEAL DRAIN









HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DELETE ASSESSMENT (MDAC #690). THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO












MANIFOLD SHAFT SEAL DRAIN







HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
....' _+ _ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DELETE ASSESSMENT (MDAC #692). THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)



























[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
c l c i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from_NASA)
C I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [




























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E05-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCULATION PUMP CHECK VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)


























CIRCULATION PUMP CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If diffeEent from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DELETE ASSESSMENT (MDAC #700). EFFECT OF FAILURE IS LOSS OF
THERMAL CONTROL BY THE CIRCULATION PUMP FOR ONE SYSTEM. THIS









ITEM: GSE CHECK VALVE











NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DELETE THIS FAILURE ANALYSIS SHEET. RUPTURE OF CHECK VALVE





















ITEM: GSE CHECK VALVE









HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




DELETE THIS FAILURE ANALYSIS SHEET. THIS FAILURE WOULD BE












ITEM: GSE CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DELETE THIS FAILURE ANALYSIS SHEET. THIS FAILURE WOULD BE


















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-EI0-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCULATION PUMP CHECK VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N A] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If differen_ from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [









































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)





























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (_if different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 02;6-SYSTEM-2
SUBSYSTEM" HYD/WS B
MDAC ID: 713
ITEM : RELIEF VALVE








[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)


























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicablei
_ _ _ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A FMEA BE GENERATED TO RECOGNIZE THIS FAILURE
MODE.














NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
C P ] C P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)


























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]













i RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ 3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [





































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (I£ different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMP_ [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ 3 [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E08-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[p] [P]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[P] [P] [p]
[ ] IN] [ ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )





































NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































[ / ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [







DELETE THIS ASSESSMENT. THIS FAILURE WOULD PROBABLY OCCUR IN THE



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
































RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E39-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]




[p] [P] [P] [X]
[p] [P] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C I ] [ ] E ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ]






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-201200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY .... REDUNDANCY SCREENS ...... CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




3/IR CRITICALITY IS BASED ON POSSIBILITY OF FLUID FREEZING
LOCALLY AS A RESULT OF LOSS OF HEATERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-201200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [

















































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
i RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




3/IR CRITICALITY IS BASED ON POSSIBILITY OF FLUID FREEZING








NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-201200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER NO. 37









NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




3/IR CRITICALITY IS BASED ON POSSIBILITY OF FLUID FREEZING






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-201200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER NO. 37




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C













NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-201100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C P ] [ P ] C P ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




3/IR CRITICALITY IS BASED ON POSSIBILITY OF FLUID FREEZING



















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-201100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X 3
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




3/IR CRITICALITY IS BASED ON POSSIBILITY OF FLUID FREEZING



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-201100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-201100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER NO. 40




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




3/IR CRITICALITY IS BASED ON POSSIBILITY OF FLUID FREEZING

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-201100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER NO. 40









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-201100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 811
ITEM: FUSE 51, 52, 53





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /!R ]
COMP_ [ /N ]
REDUND_CY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]













RECO_ENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




3/IR CRITICALITY IS BASED ON POSSIBILITY OF FLUID FREEZING
























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DELETE MDAC ID #812. THIS ITEM WAS COVERED IN THE HEATER
HARDWARE FMEA.
i











THERMOSTAT (S16, S17, $4)
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN _: ....
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-201000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























POWER CONTACTOR (K3, K4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS LOSS OF POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF ONE CIRC, PUMP WELL NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE










NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2114-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER CONTACTOR (K3, K4)





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO CONTROL POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE CIRC PUMP AT
APU START OR DURING APU OPERATION. LOSS OF ONE CIRC. PUMP WILL
NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE NOR WILL IT RESULT

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER (K3), AR TYPE III








NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA C 3 /3
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
C NAg C NA_ _ NA_ C 3
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
C /3
(If different from NASA)
] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE CIRC PUMP AT
APU START OR DURING APU OPERATION_ .....LosS=OF ONE CIRC. P0q4P WILL
NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE NOR WILL IT RESULT









NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-IL!
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER (K3), AR TYPE III
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS LOSS OF POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF ONE CIRC. PUMP WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE


































HYBRID DRIVER (K4), AR TYPE III





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C P ] [ P ]
CP] [P]












(If different from NASA)
] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS Loss OF POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF ONE CIRC. PUMP WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE








NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER (K4), AR TYPE III
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[N] IN] IN]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO CONTROL POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE CIRC PUMP AT
APU START OR DURING APU OPERATION. LOSS OF ONE CIRC. PUMP WILL
NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE NOR WILL IT RESULT














NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-1M2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER (K4), AR TYPE II




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS DRIVER IS TO PREVENT CIRC PUMP OPERATION
DURING APU OPERATION. INADVERTENT OPERATION INHIBITS ONE
REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE TO CIRC. PUMP.
=





NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-IMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER (K4), AR TYPE II




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















































RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER - 1.2K




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )






















RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER - 1.2K





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-1K
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BLOCKING DIODE - 3A





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















BLOCKING DIODE - 3A





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-1Q
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR CURRENT LIMITER - 5.1K




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]












NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-1Q
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER - 5.1K




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-1P
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTORS - VOLTAGE DIVIDERS - 1.8K




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-1P
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTORS - VOLTAGE DIVIDERS - 1.8K









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]











(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-1Q
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CURRENT LIMITER RESISTORS 2.15K




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








CURRENT LIMITER RESISTORS 2.15K
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA FMEA #: 05=6G-200400-III
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BLOCKING DIODE - 3A





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )

















BLOCKING DIODE - 3A





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC. PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS LOSS OF POWER TO ONE CIRC. PUMP.
LOSS OF ONE CIRC. PUMP WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE
NOR WILL IT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF A CIRC.


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-1J
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BLOCKING DIODE - MDM CIRCUIT 3A




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )










NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-IJA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BLOCKING DIODE - MDM CIRCUIT 3A
LEAD ANALYST : J . DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO ENABLE THE GPC TO PROVIDE POWER
TO ONE CIRC PUMP. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS LOSS OF POWER TO
ONE CIRC. PUMP. LOSS OF ONE CIRC. PUMP WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS
OF LIFE OR VEHICLE NOR WILL IT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-II-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BLOCKING DIODES SW "ON" CIRCUIT (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-II2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BLOCKING DIODES SW "ON" CIRCUIT (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC. PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS LOSS OF POWER TO ONE CIRC. PUMP.
LOSS OF ONE CIRC. PUMP WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE
NOR WILL IT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF A CIRC.




















NEW [ X ]
HYD/WSB
840
CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR, 1.21K
J. DUVAL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC. PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS LOSS OF POWER TO ONE CIRC. PUMP.
LOSS OF ONE CIRC. PUMP WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE
NOR WILL IT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF A CIRC.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-1F
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYD CIRC PUMP SW 29
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS SWITCH IS TO CONTROL THE CIRC. PUMP
OPERATION. APU SWITCH TURNS OFF PUMP DURING APU OPERATION.



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-1D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYD CIRC PUMP SW 29




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
u
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















HYD CIRC PUMP SW 29
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC. PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS LOSS OF POWER TO ONE CIRC. PUMP.
LOSS OF ONE CIRC. PUMP WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE
NOR WILL IT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF A














NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-1H
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR, 1.21K
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY .... P_DU_DANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVDE POWER TO ONE CIRC. PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS LOSS OF POWER TO ONE CIRC. PUMP.
LOSS OF ONE CIRC. PUMP WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE







NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-1G
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 845
ITEM: FUSE F7, FI5




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVDE POWER TO ONE CIRC. PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS LOS_OF POWER TO ONE CIRC. PUMP.
LOSS OF ONE CIRC. PUMP WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE




























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVDE POWER TO ONE CIRC. PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS LOSS OF POWER TO ONE CIRC. PUMP.
LOSS OF ONE CIRC. PUMP WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE









NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200700-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYDRAULIC FLUID QUANTITY METER, CB 57





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2080-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE IV
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS ClL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER FURTHER REVIEW/ANALYSIS IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE IV
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ _
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1E
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1JA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BLOCKING DIODE, GROUND MDM (-IA,-3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















BLOCKING DIODE, GROUND MDM (-IA,-3A)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:













NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1JB
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BLOCKING DIODES, GROUND MDM (-IA,-3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










ASSESSMENT ID: k HYDWSB-854A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1JH
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 854
ITEM: BLOCKING DIODES, GROUND MDM (-IA,-3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )













NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1JI
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 855
ITEM: BLOCKING DIODES, (-IA, -3A)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N]COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




[ ] [ ] *











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-10B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (2.15K)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (2.15K)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )






























RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (5.1K)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
L
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if_different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-10B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (5.1K)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2088-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]







[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
m RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, HYD MAIN PUMP PRESS (S26,27,28)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SCREEN SHOULD BE BLANK PER NSTS-22206.
C ]
C ]















NASA [ 3 /3
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ J [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /3 J
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ J [ 3
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 866
ITEM: FUSE (IA, FI4)





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH SCREEN B
[ ]
[ ]







NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1G
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )































NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1H
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:













NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1H
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K)




HDW/FUNC A _ B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1G
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (1.21K)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]







COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SCREEN SHOULD BE BLANK PER NSTS-22206.
[ ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1JG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1JF
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1JFA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2085-I
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 874
ITEM: BLOCKING DIODE (12A)








[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
[ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)














































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200300-IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SPLIT INTO TWO FMEA'S. SWITCH FAILS IN "GPC" POSITION SHOULD BE



















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200300-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SW
J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SPLIT INTO TWO FMEA'S. SWITCH FAILS IN "GPC" POSITION SHOULD BE
SEPARATE FROM "OPEN" POSITION.
SWITCH IN "OPEN" POSITION REMOVES ONE LEVEL OF ISOLATION FROM
"RETRACT" HYDRAULIC CIRCUIT. REDUNDANT S/O VALVE AND L.G. DUMP
SOLENOID MUST ALSO FAIL. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY AND
SCREENS.
L






NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2076-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (I.21K)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2075-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (5.1K)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2074-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BLOCKING DIODE, "CLOSE" GROUND COMMAND




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [











NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2073-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HYD/WSB
883
BLOCKING DIODE (RETURN CIRCUIT)
J. DUVAL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)




2/IR CRITICALITY IS BASED ON INABILITY TO CENTER ENGINE FOR RE-
ENTRY. REF. MDAC ID#497, FMEA-02-6-A06-3.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2072-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE IV, RETURN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2072-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE IV, RETURN CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
i
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




2/IR CRITICALITY IS BASED ON INABILITY TO CENTER ENGINE FOR RE-
ENTRY. REF. MDAC ID #497, FMEA-02-6-A06-3.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2071-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, VLV CLOSE CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2071-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, VLV CLOSE CIRCUIT







HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2070-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, VLV OPEN CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2070-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, VLV OPEN CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2069-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BLOCKING DIODE, 3A, CLOSE CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2069-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







BLOCKING DIODE, 3A, CLOSE CIRCUIT
J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
_ ._ [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2068-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MPS/TVC ISO VLV CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































MPS/TVC ISO VLV CONTROL SW
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]










(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA REDUNDANCY SCREENS
ix]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2068-i
NASA DATA: ............
-_ BASELINE [ ]






MPS/TVC ISO VLV CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





































NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2067-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K) RETURN DRIVER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2067-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K) RETURN POWER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2066-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDACID: 895
ITEM: CURRENTLIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K) OPEN/CLOSE
DRIVERS POWERCONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2066-I
NASA DATA:
BA_ELIN_ [ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




2/IR CRITICALITY IS BASED ON INABILITY TO CENTER ENGINE FOR RE-
ENTRY. REF. MDAC ID #497, FMEA-02-6-A06-3. NASA SCREENS SHOULD

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2065-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2065-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ISOLATION DIODE (SYSTEM I)










NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2064-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (CLOSE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
w
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL SCREEN B. REDUNDANCY IS










NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2064-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (CLOSE)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NEW [ X ]
HYD/WSB
901
CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (OPEN)






HDW/FUNC A B C
[ X ] *
ix]
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ]COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
1 k
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2056-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (OPEN)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2063-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
J J
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2062-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MDM INPUT CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (5.1K)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2061-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ISOLATION DIODE (MONITOR CIRCUIT)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2061-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2060-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.2K)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMP_ [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2060-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.2K)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2059-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [







































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2057-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)









































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
HYDWSB-911
05-6G-2055-3










[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)













BASELINE [ ] __
NEW [ X ]
HYD/WSB
912






NASA [ 2 /IR ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [













































NEW [ X ]
LG HYDRAULIC ISOLATION VLV SW





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2054-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ISO VLV CTL CIRCUIT RESISTOR (I.21K)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:




























NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0633-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BLOW-OFF STEAM VENT PLUG




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
CHANGE "FAILURE MODE" ON 06-3A-0633-I TO "RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH
STEAM VENT NOZZLE". CHANGE "CAUSES" TO "STUCK OR INJESTED BLOW-
OFF STEAM VENT PLUG. "
w

















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6WA-2129-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]







[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2051-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
SCREEN B NOT APPLICABLE FOR STANDBY REDUNDANCY. FAILURE DOES NOT
MEET CIL CRITERIA.

















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2086-1B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONTROL BUS RESISTORS, WSB CNTRLR PWR HTR SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















CONTROL BUS RESISTORS, WSB N2 SUPPLY SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
HYDWSB-1841X
05-6WA-2055-2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
HYD/WSB
1841













[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2208-1B
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 1862
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CIRCUIT





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NEW [ X ]
HDC TYPE i, GRD BOILER ON CMD




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
HYD/WSB
1901




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C06-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







VALVE, CHECK, L.G. HYD. CKT. FUSELAGE RETURN





NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















VALVE, CHECK, L.G. HYD. CKT. FUSELAGE RETURN






HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2078-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







DIODE, SURGE SUPPR. (3 AMP) HYD MN PUMP DEPRESS





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOa [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [












NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







DIODE, ISOL, HYD MN PMP DEPRESS VALVE SOLENOID




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /iR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ S /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







DIODE, ISOL (3A), HYD MN PMP DEPRESS VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2095-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HYBRID DRIVER TYPE 4, HYD L.G. RETR/CIRC VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-00100-1B
NASA DATA:







DIODE, HYD MN PUMP DEPRESS VLV SOL CKT.




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS PRE 51-L FMEA/CIL. ITEM NOT REFLECTED AS POST 51-L CIL ITEM
IN THE PRE CCB CIL WAIVER PACKAGE (8 DECEMBER 1987). IOA









NASA FMEA #: 0S-6G-2004OO-INA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONTROL FUSE (3A) HYD CIRC PUMP CNTRL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-1NB
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER FUSE (150 AMP), H40 CIRC PUMP CNTL
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS LOSS OF POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF ONE CIRC PUMP WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE,
NOR WILL IT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF A CIRC






NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-1B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: B461
ITEM: PWR SW $25




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































SASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200400-IC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 8462
ITEM: PWR SW $25





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200300-IC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, (IA) LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)































NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200300-1D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







RESISTOR, (1.21K), LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200300-1E
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] _:






RPC, LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID CKT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200300-1F
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID CKT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
__i
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
HYD/WSB
8755




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NEW [ X ]
HYD/WSB
8756
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
CIL
ITEM

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200300-1J
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable) _ .... __
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [









NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200300-1KA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







DIODE, SURGE SUPP, (3A), LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:



























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





























DIODES, RPC PWR ISOLATION,





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200300-1KD
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N]




[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200300-1KE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, GROUND ISOLATION, (15A)





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)





ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/13/88 ......
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-8764X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200300-1KF
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, MONITOR ISOLATION, (I.SK) (2.2K)(5.1K)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [N] [N] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2003000-1KG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, SHORT CKT PROTECTION




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )


















LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SW





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2057-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




















NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2054-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ISO VLV CTL CIRCUIT RESISTOR (I.21K)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















































































































































































LEAKAGE - H20 EXT
LEAKAGE - GN2 INT

















































































































































































HOSE _D SWI_L ASSY
HOSE _D SWI_L ASSY
HOSE _D SWI_L ASSY
HOSE _D SWIVEL ASSY
HOSE _ID SWIVEL ASSY
HOSE _D SWIVEL ASSY
HOSE _D SWIVEL _SY











_DING GE_ D_P SOL
_DING GE_ D_P SOL
PRIORITY VALVE
PRIORITY VALVE
_- _ 47_ _ " _DINGGE_ ISO_TION
480 _DING GE_ ISO_TION
























































































































































































644 E.T. UMBILICAL R_TRAC
646 E.T. UMBILICAL RETRAC
646 E.T. UMBILICAL RETRAC



























































































































































































SWITCH, HYD MAIN PUMP







MPS/TVC ISO VLV CONTR
















HYBRID DRIVER TYPE 4




























































This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
20, Analysis of the Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem, (20
December 1987). Prior results were obtained independently and
documented before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity.
Supplemental analysis was performed to address failure modes not
previously considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the
hardware item being analyzed, parent assembly and function
performed. For each failure mode possible causes are identified,
and hardware and functional criticality for each mission phase
are determined as described in N$TS 22206, Instructions for
preparation of FMEA and CIL, I00ctobe_ 1986. _ Failure mode
effects are described at the bottom of each sheet and worst case
criticality is identified at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 _ Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen


















BLOW-OFF STEAM VENT PLUG
RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH STEAM DUMP NOZZLE
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
BREAKDOWN _HIE_CHY: "
1) WATER SPRAY BOILER
2) WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
3 ) S_E_ DUMP NO Z Z I_E _






SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/iR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING:" 2/IR




CAUSES: VENT PLUG STUCK OR INJESTED BLOW-OFF STEAM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING BOILER OPERATION THE STEAM WOULD HAVE NO ESCAPE ROUTE,
ACTIVATING THE STEAM VENT RELIEF VALVE. LOSS OF SYSTEM.













































LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) WATER SPRAY BOILER
2) GN2 SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF GN2 PREVENTS EXPULSION OF H20 TO THE BOILER RESULTING IN





VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: CB FAILS CLOSED, CANNOT BE OPENED















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LfFTOFF 3/3 _ TAL: .... _/3 _-
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: JAMMING, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSTANT POWER TO CONTROLLER A/B CONTACT ON APU/HyD BQ_LER
CONTROLLER POWER/HEATER SWITCH.












































FAILS OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF II5VAC POWER TO BOILER CONTROLLER AND BYPASS VALVE. LOSS
OF HYDRAULIC FLUID AND LUBE OIL COOLING. POSSIB_ LOSS OF SYSTEM
ON ASCENT.




REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-5
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: BOILER CONTROL POWER/HEATER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION (CLOSING) OF SWITCH











WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
PANEL R2
BOILER CONTROL POWER/HEATER SW ($41)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR




CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER WOULD BE APPLIED TO HYBRID DRIVERS ANT TO BYPASS_VALVE,
FAILURE DOES NOT MEET CIL CRITERIA.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12


































INADVERTENT OPERATION, PREMATURE TRANSFER TO "ON"











WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
PANEL R2
BOILER CNTRL SW ($38)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
POWER TO SPRAY VALVE CONTROL CIRCUITS REMAINS ON.
REFERENCES: VS70-580119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















CONTROL BUS RESISTORS, WSB CNTRLR PWR HTR SW
SHORTS
SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSONLEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
WATER SPRAY BOILER
PANEL R2























B [NA ] C [NA ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: 32V73A2(VS70-580119E)
PART NUMBER:


















































CONTROL BUS RESISTORS, WSB N2 SUPPLY SWITCH
SHORTS
SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSONLEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
PANEL R2
































VS70-580119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: SWITCH, "APU/HYDBOILER N2 SUPPLY"
FAILU_MODE:SWITCH FAILS CLOSED (ALL CONTACTS)











WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
PANEL R2
BOILER N2 SUPPLY SW ($44)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO EXPELL WATER. LOSS OF SYSTEM DURING ENTRY.
WSB IN POOL MODE FOR ASCENT.











































































CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





V70-580119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL II,
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-II
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1865 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HDC TYPE I, GRD BOILER ON CMD
OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND, INADVERTENT OUTPUT _




































CAUSES: THERMAL STESS, STRUCTURAL FAILURES, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT ACTIVE DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES".
SECT 12









































DIODE, GND CMD ISOL, IA, WSB CNTRLR PWR CKTRY
OPEN











WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
AFT PCA
ISOLATION DIODE (AICR6, 8)
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE
REFERENCES: VS70-580119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
m
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/01/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: I/i
MDAC ID: 5000 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: VALVE, CHECK, L.G. HYD. CKT. FUSELAGE RETURN LINE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 50V58CVI9, 20, 21 (VS70-580999)
PART NUMBER: ME284-0434-1012, -1014
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


















REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









VALVE, CHECK, L.G. HYD. CKT. FUSELAGE RETURN LINE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
50V58CVI9, 20, 21 (VS70-580999)
ME284-0434"I012, -1014
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BROKEN SPRING, DAMAGED SEAT/POPPET
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILS TO PROTECT AGAINST LOSS OF ALL HYDRAULIC FLUID IN CASE OF
LEAK UPSTREAM OF CHECK VALVE.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS70-580119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


















(3 AMP) HYD MN PUMP DEPRESS












DEPRESS VALVE SOLENOID CKT
AFT PCA
DIODE, SURGE SUPPRESSION (3 AMP)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 55V76AI35 (VS70-580109E)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:_ _ _ _
LOSS OF ARC SUPPRESSION FOR CIRCUITRY, LOSS OF REDUNDANCY, SECOND


































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/03/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 8002 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: DIODE, ISOL, HYD MN PMP DEPRESS VALVE SOLENOID CKT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN































CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO POWER RETURN TO MAIN PUMP DEPRESS SOLENOID.




VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, VOL.
w
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-17
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










DIODE, ISOL (3A), HYD MN PMP DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
HYDRAULIC MAIN PUMP













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 55V76AI23 (VS70-580109E)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR POWER RETURN TO MAIN PUMP DEPRESS
SOLENOID, SECOND FAILURE POTENTIAL LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM.


































HYBRID DRIVER TYPE 4, HYD L.G. RETR/CIRC VLV SOL.
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS TO GROUND











MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RETRACT CIRC VALVE SOL CKT
FWD LCA























CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, FIRST FAILURE, CLOSED DRIVER MUST BE ENERGIZED TO
CLOSE VALVE. SECOND FAILURE RPC FAILS ON ACTUATING SOLENOID
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL.
II, SECT. 12.
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE, HYD MN PUMP DEPRESS VLV SOL CKT.
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: 55V76AI35
PART NUMBER:
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE OPEN WILL POSSIBLY CASE LOSS OF RPCAND/OR HYBRID DRIVER.







































CONTROL FUSE (3A) HYD CIRC PUMP CNTRL
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









AFT AVIONICS BAY 4
AFT POWER CONTACTOR ASSEMBLY NO. 4
CONTROL FUSE (3A)
CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
_J
z
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-21
7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












POWER FUSE (150 AMP), H40 CIRC PUMP CNTL
OPEN












AFT AVIONICS BAY 4
AFT POWER CONTACTOR ASSEMBLY NO. 4






















CAUSES : VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
























FAILS OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC CIRC PUMP
2) PANEL AI2



































REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















INTERNAL SHORT ALL CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) HYDRAULIC CIRC PUMP
2) PANEL AI2








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE CIRC. PUMP BECAUSE OFF INDETERMINATE CIRCUIT
BEHAVIOR (RELAY RACE).











































FUSE, (IA) LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)











SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RETRACT CIRC VALVE
PANEL R4
LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID
FUSE (IA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING/PROTECTION OF POWER TO N/6:SOLENOIb
VALVE FOR LG RETRACT/CiRCH_D_ULIC OPERATIONS_bURING GROUND
TURNAROUND ONLY.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, VOL. II, SECT. 12





ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET






RESISTOR, (I.21K), LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID
OPEN (ELECTRICAL) SHORTED











MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RET_CT CIRC VALVE
PANEL R4

























CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .......
SHORT, NO EFFECT. OPEN, LOSS OF REDUND_T P0WER souRcE TO
ENERGIZE SOLENOID. RESISTOR PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING OF POWER
TO NORMALLY CLOSE SOLENOID VALVE FOR LANDING GEAR RETRACT/CIRC
HYDRAULIC OPERATION DURING GROUND TURNAROUND ONLY.
REFERENCES:
_ _ii_ _ _ _ 11 _ _
VS70-580109E, VOL. II, SECT. 12























RPC, LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID CKT
OPEN (ELECTRICAL) LOSS OF OUTPUT











MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RETRACT CIRC VALVE
FPCA 1,2
LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID CKT
RPC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: tONTAMINATION, MEC_ICA_ SHOCK, PIECE_PART_?AILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO ENERGIZE SOLENOID. FAILURE EFFECTS
APPLICABLE ONLY DURING GROUND TURNAROUND/CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, VOL. II, SECT. 12

















RPC, LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID CKT
INADVERTANT OPERATION










MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RETRACT CIRC VALVE
FPCA 1,2
LG RETRACT VLV SOLENOID CKT
RPC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR


















































HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 4, LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV
OPEN (ELECTRICAL) LOSS OF OUTPUT








I) MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
2) RETRACT CIRC VALVE SOLENOID CKT
3) FLCA 1,2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, VOL. II, SECT. 12
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE i, LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









RETRACT/CIRC VALVE SOLENOID CKT
FLCA 1,2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 81V76AI7 (VS70-580109E)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
















































HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE i, LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV
INADVERTENT OUTPUT











MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RETRACT CIRC VALVE
FLCA 1,2
LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, VOL. II, SECT. 12
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















DIODE, SURGE SUPP, (3A), LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
2) RETRACT CIRC VALVE
3) FPCA 2
4) LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID CKT























CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








































DIODE, BUS ISOLATION, (IA) (3A)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED











MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RETRACT CIRC VALVE
FLCA/FPCA I, 2
LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID VLVE CKT
DIODE, BUS ISOLATION, (IA) (3A)
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]











REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, VOL. II, SECT. 12
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: DIODES, RPC PWR ISOLATION, (2A) (12A)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED











MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RETRACT CIRC VALVE
FPCA 1,2
LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID VALVE CK
DIODE, RPC PWR ISOLATION (2A) (12A)
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23, A22 (VS70-580109E)
PART NUMBER:
C [NA ]














































DIODE, GROUND ISOLATION, RETRACT/CIR VLV,
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED











SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RETRACT CIRC VALVE
FLCA 1,2
LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID VALVE CKT
DIODE, GROUND ISOLATION, (2A) (15A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
82V76A23, AI6, AI7 (VS70-580109E)LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES". VS70-580109E, VOL. II, SECT. 12
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












DIODE, GROUND ISOLATION, (15A)
SHORT TO GROUND _ _











SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RETRACT CIRC VALVE
FLCA 1,2
RETRACT/CIRC VLV SOLENOID VALVE CKT
DIODE, GROUND ISOLATION, (15A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR _ .....
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7,AI6 (VS70-580109E)
PART NUMBER:









































RESISTOR, MONITOR ISOLATION, (I.8K) (2.2K) (5.1K)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)











MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RETRACT CIRC VALVE SOLENOID CAT
FPCA/FLCA 1,2
RESISTOR, MONITOR ISOLATION (I.8K) (2.2K) (5. IK)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, VOL. II, SECT. 12
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

























MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RETRACT CIRC VALVE
FPCA-I
LG RETRACT/CIRC SOLENOID VALVE CKT
RESISTOR, SHORT CKT PROTECTION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR










































LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SW
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)











MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RETRACT CIRC VALVE
PANEL R4
LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SW
CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL.
II, SECT. 12
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-39
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: MDM ISOLATION DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 02/26/88 E-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















ISO VLV CTL CIRCUIT RESISTOR (I.21K)
SHORT












LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
PANEL R4
ISO VLV CTL CIRCUIT RESISTOR (I.21K)
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

















































OPEN, SHORT, OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






























NASA FHEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOI_MENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA
and corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix
E. The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment












IOA Recommends a Higher Criticality
IOA Recommends Additional Failure Mode
IOA Recommends A Lower Criticality
IOA Recommends Change to a Redundancy
Screen
IOA Concurs With NASA Analysis
Delete IOA Failure Mode
Delete FMEA From CIL





@i_ +_00R QUALITY GPPENDIXF
NASAFMEATO IDAWORKSHEETCROSSREFERENCE/ RECOMMENDATIONS
IDENTIFIERS ,," NASA
NASA I IOA ::CRIT I SCREENS
FMEANUMBER :ASSESSMENTNUMBER:IHW/F IA B C






























































































I.............. "" ................................ i
IGRIT t SCREENSt OTHER ISSUE
I HWIF I A B C : (SEELEGENDCODE> I
I 3/IR NA
: 313 NA NANA
2/IR P P P
i





2/IR P P F'
i
/
















2/IR P F P
l
/
































































..... ' PAGEORI_:r,_A, ....... IS
OF _OOR QUALITY
.+
; IDENTIFIERS _ NASA ;_ IDA RECOMMENDATIONS* _ _.
i !tASA = IOA I_ CRIT I SCREENSII CRIT








































































































NA NA NA :', t
P P P _; t





















P P P I_ /
P P P _ I
P P P II I
F NAP II 3/3
NA NA I,IA II i
P P P II /
P P P .II /
P P P t_ l
P P P II /
P P P ',_ ]
MA NA NA II /
NA NA NAII /
P P P ,," t
i!
,r
P P P I; i
P P P I; l
NA NA NA _', /
P F P t_ !
SCREENS _ OTHER I ISSUEI
A B C | (GEELEGENDCODE) I I
t III II t _ i
NA NA NA 2 I X
6
NA NA NA 2 l X
HA NA NA 2 ; X
6
NA NA NA 2 _ X
a




P P P 2 ', k
6






NA NA NA 2 I X
t




NA NA NA I
NA NA NA I







: OF POOR QUALITY
IDENTIFIERS ,," NASA II IOA RECOMMENDATIONS* ;
t ......... l! ............. i
NASA : I.OA . :: CRIT I SCREENS t:_R!T I SCREEHS OTHER _ ISSUE;
FMEA HUMBER I ASSESSMENTNUMBER IIH_/F I _ B C I:HW/F I A B C (SEELEGENDCODE)
= = I _I : II " I _ == ===== .... === ............
02-6-C05-4 : HYDW_B-646A II 2/[R P F P II / I 5
D2-6-C06-2 ; HYDWSB-5OOOX It I/I NA NA NA It / I
I HYDWSB-5OOIX If 3/IR F HA P :: I I _ X
02-_-C07-I I HYOWBB-481 If 2/tR P P P If /
HYDWSB-482 ,," 211R P P P tI / I
02-6-C07-2 I HYOWSB-479 II 2/|R P P P II /
HYDWSB-480 ', 2/IR P P P ,," i ;
02-6-C08-1 ' HYDWSB-450 iI 311R F' F P " I I 5i _ __ ii+
02-_-C08-2 I HYOWSB-450_ ,,"3/IR F F P ,," / I NA 5
02-_-C09-I I HYD_SB-Ba9 II 2/tR P P P ,," /
I HYDWSB-670 II 2/IR P P P II /
02-6-CI0-t % HYDWSB-672 II 3/IR F NA P tI 313 I NA NA NA 3.7 X
02-o-CI0-2 t HYDWSB-_ll II 2iIR P F P II 3tXRIP F P 3 k
02-6-E02-I I HYDWSB-4+8 II 3]IR P F P II / I 5
HYDWSB-449 I: 3/IR P F P II / : 5
02-b-ED2-2 : HYDWSB-448A II 3/tR F F P II / : NA 5
HYOWSB-449A II 3/IR F F P II ! : HA 5
02-o-EO_-[ ; HYOWSB-_26 II 2/IR P P P II I :
I HYDWBB-_27 II 2/IR P P P II / I
I HYDNSB-_30 II 2/IR P P P ,," l I
HYDWSB-_31 II 2/IR P P P ,," / ;
02-6-E03-4 I HYDWSB-_34 II ]i3 NA NA HA ,," / :
I HYDWSB-635 II ]t3 NA NA NA II /
: HYDWSB-_3_ II _/3 NA NA NA II / :
02-&-E03-5 I HYOW_B-624 II 2/IR I P P II /
O2-a-EO4-t I HYDWSB-_t5 II 313 NA NA HA II ! I
HYDW_-_B4 II _/3 NA HA NA I: /
I HYDWSB-bBg II 3/3 HA NA NA I: ] :
HYOWSB-6g4 It 3i3 NA NA NA II / I
02-_-E05 I HYOW_B-6g5 II 3/3 NA NA NA II / I
02-a-E05-I I HYOWSB-685 II 3i3 HA NA HA II 1 I
I HYDWSB-687 it 313 NA NA NA II I I , 5
I HYDWSB-_g7 I; _13 HA NA HA II / I 5
02-_-E05-2 I HYDWSB-686 ,," 3i3 NA NA HA II t I
I HYDWSB-bBB " 3/3 NA NA N_ II t I 5
I HYDWSB-6% iI 3/3 NA NA NAII / I
I HYOWSB-6g8 I 313 NA HA NAII / I I
02-6-E0_-I I HYDWSB-b05 I 2/tR P P P II / ;
, I HYDWSB-6O6 I 2ilR I P P II 1 I
02-6-E06-2 I HYDWSB-604 I 211R P P P II I I
02-6-E0_-_ I HYDW_B-$O8 I 21IR I P P II I I
I HYD_SB:bII I 2/IR P P P II / I ,
02-_-E0@-5 I HYDWSB-601 I i/I HA NA HA II I I 5
I HYDWSB-610 I 2/IR i P P II / I
02-6-E07-I I HYDWSB-622 ,,"3/3 HA NA NA ,," /
02-6-E07-2 I HYOWSB-6_I " 313 NA NA NA " / I 5II
02-6-EOB-I I HYDWSB:720 -,,"313 NA NA NA II / ;
02-_-E08-2 I HYDWSB-70g ,,"21tR P P P ,," I I
02-6-E08-4 IHYDWS8-722 ,," 21IR P F P II 1 I 5
















IDENTIFIERS II NASA _I IDA RECOMMENDATIONS* I
..........................................II ..............I; ..............................................
NASA I IOA 11CRIT I SCREENS _ICRIT ) SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE































































































































P F P II / I 15
P P P II I I I
NA NA N_ II / I I
NA NA HA If / I I
NA NA NA If / I I
NANA NA If / I I
NA NA NA If i I I
NA NA NA II I I I
NA NA NA II i I I
NANA NA If / I
NA NA NA If / I
NA NA NA If I I ', 5
NANA NA If i I
NA NA NA If i I I
NA NA NA If / I I
NA NA NAlI ; ;
NA NANA ',_ / I I
P P P II / I
P P P II I I I
P P P II / I 15
P P P II I ; 15
NA NA NA If t I I
P P P II I I
NA NA NAII I I I
N_ NANA If t I I









P P P II / I
P P P II t I
PPPII/;
11 I I
P P It t I
PPPII/I
P P II / I
NA NA NAII / I
_NANAII i I
NA NA NA II t I
PPPIIII
NA NA NAII / I
NA NB NAII I I
P F P ,," 2/IR
NA NA NAII I I


























OF _R QUALIW I
I IDENTIFIERS _I NASA i_ IOA RECOMMENDATIONS*
;; I....
HASA i IDA _I CRIT i SCREENS_; CRIT I SCREENS_ OTHER i ISSUE



















































I; 3/3 I NAHA RA i_ /
II 21IR I P P P _I I I
II 2/IR I P P P II l I
" 3]IR I P F P II 2/IR I
,," 313 t NA HAI_ ,," I
;I 3liR ; P F P ,," 1 I
,, 21IR : P P P ,," I :
il 211R _ P P P II t l
_] 211R I P P P II I I
II 21IR I P P P II 1
II 2/IR I P P P I; i ;
;I 2ilR ; P P P II / I
II 21[RI P P P I; I ;
i; 2/]R I P P P ii i ;
,, 2/IR I P P P ,," / i
" 21JR I P P P ;_ I I
",, 2i[R I P P P ,," i I
tl
,, 211R I P P P ,," t I
II 2/IR I P P P _I / I
II 21IR I P P P ;I I I
'" 211R ] P P P ]l / lII
_l 2tIR I P P P II / l
;; 21IR I P P P Ii t I
il 21IR ; P P P II I ;
I; 2/IR I P P P il / I
I; 21IR I P P P II i ;
,," 21IR I P P P I_ / I
,," 211R I P P _ ,," i
" 2]|R I P P P it i ;fl
;l 21IR ; P P F' ,," i l
II 2IIR i P P P II i I
II 211R I P P P II t I
II 2/IR I P P P II / l
II 211R I P P P II / l
II 2i1R ; P P P II i ;
ii 21IR I P P P ,," / I
=
",, 211R IP P P I; / I
" 2/IR I P P P +'
ii
,, 2/1R ;P P P ,," i I
=
_t 2iIR I P P P II / I
11 2/IR I P P P II / l
II 21IR I P P P II 31 ;
II 21tR ; P P P II ] l
II 211R I P P P ;I 1 l
II 313 I NA NA NA ;I I l
II 313 I NAHA NA I] 1 ;
II 313 I NA NA HA II i I


















































































































IDENTIFIERS :I NASA IDA RECDMMENDATIDNS* I
.................. I
i .......................................... II'''" i ................................................
] NASA I IDA ,,"CRIT _ SCREENS ,,"CRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE:



























































































:: 313 I NA NA NAII
II 3/3 INA NANA I_
It 2/1R I F F P II
II 313 I It
It 313 I II
II 313 I II
II 3/3 I II
lI 313 I II
II 3/IR IP P P II
I 3/IR I P P P II
I 313 I ;;
I 313 l 11
II 31IR I P P P II
II 311R I P P P II
II 31IR I P P P II
II 313 I II
II 3/3 I II
II 3/IR I P P P II
,, _t_ I II
I 313 I HA MAMA II
I 311R I P F P II
I 311R I P F P II
I _13 I II
I 3]IR I P P P II
I 3/3 I II
I 311R I P P P II
I 3/IR I P P P II
I 3/3 I NA HA NA II
I 31_ I NA NA NAII
I 313 I HA NA NAII
I 313 I NA NANA II
I 3/IR I P P P II
I 3/3 I NA HA NA II
I 313 I HA NA NA II
I 3tIR I P P P II
I 313 I II
I 3/3 I II
I 313 I II
I 3i3 I II
I 3]IR I P F P II
I 313 I II
[ 3/3 I P NAP II
I 3/3 I II
I 313 I NANA NA II
I 311R I P P P II
I 3/1R I P P P II
I 3/iR _ P P P II






































































2,3 I X l
2+5 I _: I
I I
3 I X I
2, 3 I X I
2, ,3 : X I








IDENTIFIERS 11 N_SA 11 IOA RECOMMENDATIONS, :
.......................................... II .................. I: ................................................ =
NASA I iDA IICRIT I SCREENS IICRIT
FMEANUBBER I ASSESSMENTNUMBER11HW/F I A B C IIHWIF










05-6G-200400-I_ I HYOWSB-B36 I
05-6G-200400-I_A I HYDWSB-837




05-6G-200400-IHI ; HYDWSB-B23 ;
05-6G-200400-IM2 I HYDWSB-822 ;
05-aG-2OO4OO-tNA I HYDWSB-BI6tX
05-68-200400-INB I HYOWSB-BI62X I
05-_G-2OO4OO-INC I HYDWSB-816 11
05-_G-200400-tP I HYDWSB-830 ,,"
I HYDWSB-831 "




05-6G-200700-1 I HYDWSB-847 II
05-6G-20|000-I I HYDWSB-BH I_
05-aG-201000-2 I HYDWSB-815 II













05-66-2053-I I HYDWSB-g501X ,,"
05-6G-2054-1 I HYDWSB-gt4 II
05-66-2054-1A : HYDWSB-gI41X II
05-6G-2055-t I HYDWSB-913 II
_5-6G-_Ouu-. : HYDWSB-gI2 II
05-6G-2055-3 IHYDWS8-?11 I:
05-6G-205b-t I HYDWSB-901 II
05-6G-2056-3 I HYOWSB-g02 II
05-_G-2057-I I HY_WSB-gIO II
I II
II 311R I P P P II
II 31IR I P P P II
II 3/IR I P P P II
II 311R I P P P II
II IIIR I P P P II
II 313 I NANA NA 11
II 313 I NA NA NAII
,," 3ilR I P P P II
311R I P P P II
313 I NA NA NA II
3/IR I P P P II
313 I NA NA NA II
313 I NA NA NA II
3/IR I P P P II
3/1R I P P P II
313 I P P P II
311R I P P P II
31IR I P P P II
_iIR I P P P II
311R I P P P II
313 I N_ NA NAII





313 I NANANA I
2/IR I P F P I
_/3 I NA NANA I
3/3 I NANA NA I
313 I NANA NA I
3/3 : NANANA I
313 I NA NA NA I
3/3 I NANA_ I
313 I NA NANA I
313 : NANANA I
_t_ I NA NA NA II
313 I NA NA NA II
313 I NA NA NA II
313 I NA NA NAII
3/3 I NA NA NA II
313 I NA NA NA II
311R I P NAP II
313 I NA NA NAII
3/IR I P NAP II
_xlR I P P P II
2/1R I P P P II
2/IR I P P P II
211R I P P P II
















































SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE;
A B C I (SEELEGENDCODE} I I
I = : I I
NA NA NA I
NA NA NA I 3
NA NA NA I 3
NA NA _ I 3




NA N_ NA : 3
I
NA N_ NA ; ,3
I
NA NA NA ',3
NA NA NA I 3
NA _IANA I
NA NG NA I 3
I
NA NA NA : 3
NA NA NA I 3
,,
NA NA NA I
NA NA NA 1












P P P II
I
P P P 11
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OF POOR QUALITY
; II)ENTIFIERS ,," NASA ,," IOA RECOMMENDATIONS÷



















































) IDA ,,"CRIT I SCREENS ,,"CRIT




















































I_ 313 I NANA NA
:i 311R I P P P
:I 313 I NA HA HA
:I 313 I NANA NA
II 313 t HANA NO,
:' 3/3 I HAHA HA 11
t 313 ) NA HA HA I]
I 3/3 ) NA HA NA 11
) 313 I NA NA NAIi
3/3 _ NA NA NA :I
t 3/3 I NANANA II
; 3/3 [ NA NA NA ))
I 2/IR ) P P P I;
) 3/3 : NANA NA II
I l13 I NA NA NA II
; 3Y3 I)IANA HA l_
I 3/3 ; NANANA II
3/3 I NA NA NA :I
I, 313 I HA HANA II
II 313 ) HA HA NA _
)I 211R I P P P l)
I) 2/IR ) P P P 11
,," 313 I NA NA HA ,,"
,," 3/3 _ NANAHA II
:I 31_ INANAHA _l
,,"3/3 I HA HA HA )I
" 3/3 t NANAHA III1
:_ 311R _ P F P II
); 3/3 I HA NA HA )_
1_ 311R I P F P II
I: 3/3 ) NA NA)IA II
): 313 I _I
II 313 I NA NA NA _I
;I 313 I NANA HA II
I_ _13 : NA NA HA II
II 31_ I HANA HA I_
I_ 311R I F F P II
II 3/IR I P F P II
II I/IR I P F P _)
;I I/IR I P F P II
,,"3/IR _ P F P ,,"
II 311R I P F P II
II 211R I P P P :l
II 2/IR I P P P II
,," 311R : P F P ,,"
II 3;IR ) P F P II
I: 311R : P f P I:
_1 31IR i F F P I:



















































SCREENS _ OTHER I ISSUE I





























NA HA HA I .3,7







IDENTIFIERS ;I NASA I! IOA RECOMMENDATIDNS* I
..... . ...................... . ............. _{ ................ II _I II " -- I I .............................................. I
NASA I IDA ,_ I!CRIT I SCEENS IICBIT = SCREENS.I OTHER..... ISSUE I
FMEA UMBER I ASSESSMENT14UMBERI!HNIF I A B C I! HW/F I A B C I {SEELEGENDCODE) I
I = I II If== = _ I= ==========..... = = =======I===== ======I========= =====l==II=====;_== ==I===========l=== === I ===_====== = _ Z
I 05-6W-2021-XA I HYDWSB-1751X II 3/3 I! I I I
I 05-6W-205t-2 I HYDWSB-I77tW II 311R P NA P I! l % NA I 7 X
I-DS-bW-2054-3 I HYDWSB-1791X I! 3i3 _ NA NA I! I I I
i 05-6W-2055-I I HYDWSB-IB4 I! 311R P P P I! I I I
I IHYDWSB-I85 ,,"3/IR P P P I! i I I
I 05-6W-2086-XA i HYDWSB-I@3 I! 311R P P P II / I NA I
I 05-6W-2086-1B _ HYDWSB-IB32X ,," 3/3 ,," / I I
I 05-6W-2086-IC IHYDWSB-IB3A ,," 3/IR P P P I! I I I
I 05-6W-2086-10 I NYOWSB-IB34X l; 3i3 'I I I I
I 05-6W-2088-I I HYOWSB-I8! I! 3t3 NA NA NA I / I I
I 05-6W-ZORq-I I HYDWSB-i82 I! _/3 NA NA NA I / I I
i 05-6W-2129-1 I HYOWSB-176 II 313 NA NA NA i / I I
i 05-6W-217q-2 I HYOWSB-189 I! 3/IR P F P I / I I 5
I 05-6W-2208-1A I HYDWSB-186 II 31IR P P P I / I NA I
I uo-o_-=_.o-._ i HYDNSB-1862X II 3itR P P ? I / ; i
_05-6W-2208-IC I HYDWSB-186A il 3/tR P P P i / : _A :
I 05-6W-220B-ID I HYOWSB-I87 I! 313 NA NA NA I / I 14A :
, vu-oW-=_OB-IE I HYDWGB-IB65X " 3f3 i '/ I NA NA NA I
-- . . I!
I 05-6W-2259-I I HYDNSB-IgO ,,"3/[R P P P I! / I NA I
I _a-o.-_-_ I HYDWSB-191 ,, 3/3 NA NA NA I! / I ;
I 05-6W-2259A-1 I HYOWSB-IgOIX II 313 P P I! / I NA NA NA I
I 05-6W-2259A-2 IHYDWSB-IgIA " 3/_ NA NA NA " / I I
I 05-6WA-2051-I t HYDWSB-177 I! 2/IR P P P II / I I 5
I I HYDWSB-IZB I! 2/IR P P P II / I NA I 5
I 05-6WA-2054-I I HYDWSB-179 II 2/IN P P P I! / I I
: I HYDWSB-I80 I! 211R P P P I! I : I
i 05-6WA-2055-2 I HYBWSB-IS4tX I; 2/IR P P P :i / I I
I 05-6WA-2129-2 i HYOWBB-1761! I! 2/IR P P P I! / I I 5
I 06-3-0607-5 I HYDWSB-147 I! 2/IR P F P I! / I I 5
I 06-3-0610-2 i HYDWSB-165 iI 3/3 NA NA NA I! / : I
i 06-3-06ti-i I HYDNSB-II4 11 3/1R P P P I! / i NA I
I i HYDWSB-II5 II 311R P P P I! I I I 5
i I HYOWSB-192 ,,"311R P P P ,," I I NA I
I I HYDWSB-Ig3 ,," 311R P P P I! ! I NA :
I 06-3-0612-I I HYDWSB-Ig4 I! 311R P P P i / I NA i
I i HYDWSB-195 l] 3/IR P P P I l I HA I
I 06-3-0613-I I HYDNSB-135 I! 313 NA NA NA I / I I
: 06-3-0614-I i HYDWSB-153 I! 313 NA NA NA I / _ I
I 06-3-0615-I I HYDWSB-151 II 3t3. NA NA NA I / I }
I 06-3-0616-I I HYDWSB-125 I! 313 NA NA NA I l I I
I 0a-3-0617-I I HYDWSB-124 I! 3/3 NA NA NA I / I
I 06-3-%17-3 ] HYDWSB-123 i! 3/3 F F P I / : NA NA NA I 5,4
I Oa-3-O617A-3 I HYDWSB-123A I! 3/3 F F P i / I NA NA NA I S,4
I 06-3-0620-I i HYDW_B-137 II ;/IR P P P I / I NA i
I I NYDWSB-138 II 3/1R P P P I / I NA l
I 06-3-0621-I I HYOW_-tt4A I! 31!R P P P i l : NA I
06-3-0622-1 I HY_NSB-122 _I 3/IR P P P ,," / I NA I
, 06-.:-.6_4-I I HYDWSB-119 I! 3f}R P P P ,," I I NA I
I I HYONSB-121 " 3/1R P P P " / I NA I 5 ,
.. II II
I 06-._-06_4-_"_ _ I HYDWSB-120 ,,"313 NA NA NA I! l I ', _






















; IDENTIFIERS :I NASA _: IDA RECOMMENDATIONS* I
NASA ] IDA I_ CRIT ; SCREENSl_ CRIT _ SCREENS_ OTHER I ISSUEI
FMEA NUMBER : ASSESSMENTNUMB_ I!HW/F I A B C tlHW/F I A B C ] (SEELEGENDCODE) : :
] ...................... ' ......... ====...... I_................ =={I ....... t .......... _..... ====:===========]=...... J
I 06-3-0624-2 HYDWSB-I2]A II 3/3 I _ NA NAII ! : NA _ 5 I
i 06-3-0625-I HYDWSB-_55 il 313 I NA NA NAII ! I l I i
: HYDWSB-I56 11 313 : NA NA NAli i I l : l
: 06-3-0626-I HYDWSB-139 1: 313 I NA NA NA :] I I l : :
: HYDWSB-140 :1 313 I NA NA _ :_ / : : i I
HYDWSB-141 11 313 I NA NA NA lI / I : I :
I 06-3-0627-I HYDWSB-III I; 311R I P P P I! / I NA : ; I
; HYDWSB-II2 I: 3/IR__P P P _I I : NA I : :
: 06-3-0627-2 HYDWSB-II3 II 31IR : P P P :: I l NA : : :
I 06-3-0628-I HYDWSB-174 i: 311R : P P P :: / ; NA I I :
: 06-3-0628-2 HYBWSB-172 ;i $/IR I F P P I! / i NA : : I
HYDWSB-173 _: 311R : F P P 1: I : NA i I I
: 06-3-0o29-| HYDWSB-130 :1 3/[R _ P P P :: I : NA : : :
; 06-3-0629-2 NVDWSB-131 _ 3/[R : F P P 11 / : P NA : 4 : X :
I v&-o-V6_l-I HYDWSB-157 I_ 3/3 i NA NA NA :I ! _ : : :
: HYDWSB-15B :: 3/3 : NA NA NA :: / : : : :
: HYDWSB-159 _ 3/3 : NA NA NA :: / : : : i
: 06-3-0632-I HYDWSB-127 11 3/tR I P P P 11 I 1 NA : I I
: HY_W_B-129 I: 31IR I P P P :1 t : NA I :
: 06-3-0632-2 HYDWSB-128 1_ 3/_ : F NAP 11 I i NA NA I 4 I X i
I HYDWSB-129A l: 3/3 : NANANA :i / I i5 : I
i 06-3A-0602-I HYDWSB-IOI 1: 211R : P P P 11. I i I : I
: 06-3A-0602-3 HYOWSB-I05 :: 2/tR _ P P P :l / : : : :
: Ob-3A-0602-4 HYDWSB-IO5A :1 211R : P P P 11 i I i ; :
I 06-3A-0603-I HYDWSB-I07 l! 211R : P P P :1 I t : : :
I O&-SA-0603-2 HYDWSB-I06 1_ 2/IR : P P P 1_ ! I : : l
I 06-3A-0603-4 HYDWSB-I04 1: 2/IR : P P F :i i I : 5 i 1
I 06-3A-0603-5 HYDWSB-IO6A :I 21IR : P P P _1 / I : i I
I 06-SA-O603-b H¥OWSB-IO4A 1i 2/1R : F F P :1 / I I 5 I :
; 06-3A-0604-1 HYDWSB-II7 11 2/IR I P P P 1_ 3/IR : NA i 3.7 : X I
06-3A-0605-I HYGWS8-I09 :I 2/IR I P P P I: ; : _ I :
06-3A-0605-2 HYDWSB-IO8 I_ 2/IR I P P P il / : I I :
: 06-3A-0605-3 HYDWSB-IOBA 11 2/;R I P P P ]: / : : : :
: 06-3A-0606-1 .........HYDWSB=14L _ . 1: 21IR I P P P 1: f I : : ;
I 06-3A-0606-2 .......li'Y_WS_SI_.... _; 3ilR _ P F P l: 12R ] P F P : 3 ; X I
I 06-3A-0606-4 NYOWSB-IDO II 2/IR : P P P _ / I : I I
] 06-3A-0607-1 HYDWSB-145 11 21IR I P P P :: / : : : i
: 06-3A-0607-2 HYDWSB-144IX :1 21|R : P P P i: / : : 1 :
I 06-3A-0607-3 HYDWSB-146 11 211R : P P P 11 t I I : ;
: 06-3A-0607-4 HYDWSB-144 1_ 21IR I P P P :1 I 1 I : :
06-SA-O608-t HYOWSB-134 _ 211R i P P P 11 1 : : : :
I 06-3A-0608-2 NYDWSB-134A I; 211R : P P P 11 / : I : I
; 06-3A-0608-3 HYDWSB-133 11 2/[R : P P P II ! I & I i
: 06-3A-0609-1 HYDWSB-142 1: Ill : _A NA NAII / 1 I : I
I 06-3A-0610-I HYDWSB-167 11 21tR I P P P _l / : _ ]
Oa-3A-0610-3 HYDWSB-170 II 1/! I NA NANA :{ / : : 5 : I
: 06-3A-0610-4 HYDWSB-16? ,,"211R : F P P ,," I : 1 _
: 06-_A-0610-5 HYDWSB-166 :1 21IR : P P P 11 / _ : : ;
: 06-3A-0613-2 HYDWSB-136 11 31IR : P F P :1 / : : 5 1 :
: 06-3A-0613-3 HYDWSB-]3@A :I 3/IR : F F P :: I I : 5 : 1
==================================================================================================================
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I HY_WSB-154A ,," _,=.RI P F P ,," I I I 5 I ,
I HYDWSB-154 II 311R I F F P ,," I I I 5 I I
I HYDWSB-152A Ii 3/tR I P F P II I I I 5 I i
I HYDWSB-152 II 311R I F F P II I I I 5 I I
I HYDWSB-126A iI 3tlR I P F P II / I I 5 I l
HYDWSB-126 II 3]IR I F F P II / I I 5 I I
HYDWSB-I02 II 211R I P P P II / I I I I
HYDWBB-I03 II 211R I P P P II / I I I I
HYDWSB-IO3A II 2iIR I P F P II / I I I I
HYDWSB-II71X II 211R I F P P II I I I I I
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